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Abstract
The following dissertation contains two related essays. The first essay explores how institutional
investor presence impacts investments during the global financial crisis. Using OLS, industry
fixed effects, and Heckman 2SLS regression approaches, I explore two ways through which
institutional investors could impact investments: liquidity and monitoring. My findings best
support monitoring theory. I find that institutional investors monitor capital and R&D levels to
maximize crisis period firm value.
The second essay is a direct fallout from my first essay. In it, I investigate how institutional
investor types influence investments. I ask, do certain types of investors improve liquidity or
monitor firm investment behavior during the global financial crisis? My results suggest that
long-term, dedicated institutional investors monitor firm investments more than short-term,
transient investors. As a result, firms with greater dedicated investor presence perform better
during the crisis periods than their peers.

Keywords: Institutional investors, monitoring theory, Heckman 2SLS, Industry Fixed Effects,
Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, Corporate Finance
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Chapter 1
“Do institutional investors affect firm investments? Evidence from the Global Financial
Crisis.”

1.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I address how institutional investors affect performance during the Global
Financial Crisis by looking at institutional investors’ influence on investments. I explore two
ways institutional investors may influence investments: through easing of financing constraints
and through monitoring. Understanding how ownership structure of equity affects decisions and
ultimately performance of the firm is important to managers and board members who, in the
interest of their shareholders, are trying to make decisions which maximize firm value. Investors
themselves are also interested in this relationship as they want to allocate their funds to firms
which will offer the highest return on risk for their capital. Understanding different
characteristics which ultimately affect performance leads to an increased informational
environment from which investors can make better decisions.
The effects of equity distribution on firm behavior has been studied extensively in past
literature. One vast strand of literature focuses on the corporate governance provided by
institutional investors, such as insurance firms, investment companies, pension funds, banks, and
money managers. Recently, the literature has focused on the role of institutional investors as
providers and facilitators of capital access. The monitoring services provided by large
institutional investors lowers information asymmetries (Boone and White, 2015) and creates
better access to cheaper external financing (Alvarez et al., 2016). Furthermore, because
1

institutional investors lower financial constraints for the firms in which they invest, these
reduced financial constraints lessen the investment-cash flow sensitivity (Agca and Mozumdar,
2008). In addition, institutional investors can directly provide capital which allows firms to
maximize the efficiency of their firm-investments (Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995; Chemmanur et
al., 2009; Krishnaswami et al., 1999; Denis and Milhov, 2002). This support becomes
particularly important during periods of financial crisis when credit is squeezed and cash flows
begin to dry up. Institutional investors, who have better information and resources and are better
able to perceive the value of projects can facilitate the capital necessary to fund them.
Motivated by this line of study, I research the impact of institutional investors on firm
liquidity by studying whether institutional investor presence and ownership concentration affect
firm investments during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. If capital access is valuable to firms, it
is likely to be especially valuable during periods of credit rationing in the financial market. As
enablers of capital access, the role of institutional investors will then be more valuable to the
firm during these periods of heightened credit contractions. One conduit through which this
improved capital access can manifest is firm investments. During a liquidity crunch, it is tougher
to raise external financing to fund investments, and as a result, firms must decrease their
investments. However, I posit that firms which have institutional investor presence, and thus
easier access to credit, are better able to attract financing when it is sparse and therefore do not
have to decrease their investments to the same extent as their peers.
However, using investments to study institutional investors’ impact on firm liquidity can
be complicated by the fact that it is also possible that institutional investors’ active monitoring
efforts outweigh any liquidity impact they provide. Monitoring theory suggests that institutional
investors, which often invest large amounts in a company, are incentivized to monitor manager
2

decisions to decrease agency costs and ensure firm behavior maximizes shareholder value. They
are able to benefit from their monitoring efforts because their size and expertise allows them to
monitor manager decisions at a lower cost than small, atomistic shareholders (Pound, 1988).
While we are searching if institutional investors allow firms to maintain investments during a
liquidity crunch, it is possible we find that institutional investors encourage firms to change their
investment behavior instead. Because of this, in addition to exploring institutional investors’
effect on liquidity through investments, I also investigate if institutional investors use
investments as a tool to monitor firm behavior. While much literature relates how ownership
structure impacts investments (see Jarrell and Lehn, 1985; Basinger, Kosnik and Turk, 1991;
Fahlenbrach, 2009), Hill and Snell (1988) find that high ownership concentration positively
influences investment in R&D resulting in greater firm profitability. Bushee (1998) finds that
institutional ownership alleviates management pressures for short-term focused R&D investing,
however, certain types of investors may induce managers to change investment behavior to
reverse an earnings decline. Beyond these studies, very few articles explore if investments are a
conduit through which institutional investors monitor firm decisions to influence firm
performance and none analyze the monitoring hypothesis effects of institutional investors during
periods of financial crisis. It is important to study how institutional owners monitor and affect
firm value during economic declines because this dynamic relationship may alter direction or
magnitude as the economic environment changes. If institutional investors provide monitoring
services to the firms in which they invest which increases firm performance, then I expect their
presence to become more valuable during periods of broad economic decline.
In my empirical analysis, I research how institutional investors impact investments in
both capital and R&D. Using regression analysis to conduct my studies is made more difficult
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by the presence of endogeneities and self- selection bias. Firms in different industries have very
different needs for capital and R&D as well as different average levels of performance. Because
of the industry specific nature of investments, I use Industry Fixed Effects to correct for this bias.
In addition, institutional investors may choose to invest in high value firms or firms with specific
investment behaviors. To correct for this selection bias, I use Heckman Two Stage Least
Squares. Using these methods, I do not find evidence through the investments mechanism that
institutional investors provide improved capital access. However, my results indicate that
institutional investors actively monitor investment behavior during the crisis period which helps
mitigate losses. This finding is consistent with monitoring theory whereby institutional investors
encourage managers to invest at a level which maximizes firm value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a thorough review of
how institutional investors impact firms through monitoring and access to credit. Section 3
describes the methodology and dataset. Section 4 focuses on our regression analysis results.
Section 5 provides concluding comments.

2.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is a plethora of literature which discusses how institutional investors affect firm decisions.
I am interested in how institutional investors influence investment decisions through their impact
on financial constraints. Hall (2002) discusses three types of problems that make raising external
funds to finance investments more difficult: adverse selection, moral hazard, and tax
considerations. Adverse selection arises when the firm has more information about its
investments than its financers. Because of the uncertainty surrounding a firm’s investments,
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investors are less willing to provide external financing. Moral Hazard occurs when there is
separation of ownership and management. Managers may choose to invest more heavily in
projects that benefit them, for example growing the firm beyond efficient scale. Or managers
may be more risk-averse than shareholders and may underinvest in riskier types of projects.
Boone and White (2015) explain that firms with greater institutional investor presence have
greater analyst following, and the monitoring provided by institutional investors allow those
firms to experience lower information asymmetries as well as improved liquidity. Alvarez et al.
(2016) document a similar result while investigating emerging markets. They find that
institutional investors, which actively monitor firm decisions, reduce financial constraints
because investor activism, lower monitoring costs, and better corporate governance improves the
information environment.
Tax considerations also impact the financing of investments. Hall (2002) explains,
because of the personal tax rate, capital gains tax rate, and dividends tax rate, financing
investments with retained earnings and newly issued equity can be more expensive than
financing investments with debt. The presence of institutional investors can also directly help
mitigate financial constraints. First, institutional investors can help firms acquire debt.
Institutional investors can directly lend to firms, for example to small firms which have trouble
raising public debt (Krishnaswami et al., 1999) or low-credit firms which have trouble accessing
bank loans (Denis and Milhov, 2002). Institutional investors are also part of a broader network
of firms which support liquidity. For example, hedge funds, banks, and insurance companies, all
or which are types of institutional investors, are very connected to each other (Billio et al., 2012).
As a result of this connectedness, institutional investors can facilitate capital access through other
intermediaries. For example, Berger and Udell (1998) explain that about 80% of venture capitals
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are made up of limited partnerships where 98% of the funds are supplied by institutional
investors. Thus, institutional investors are an important source of funds that are lent to firms by
venture capital firms; they are part of a broader network that is facilitating capital access. In
support of these studies, Ismail and Krishnaswami (2017 working paper) study lines of credit and
find that institutional investors alleviate financial constraints in the credit market. Secondly,
institutional investors can help firms directly raise equity. In the event new shares are issued,
institutional investors can directly provide the firm with capital for investments by purchasing
the new equity. For example, Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) show that institutional investors are
the primary purchasers of new IPO’s, while Chemmanur et al. (2009) shows that institutional
investors possess private information about SEO’s and obtain more allocations of SEO’s in
which they collect favorable information. Thus, institutional investors providing direct purchases
of new equity becomes particularly important during the financial crisis when credit is squeezed
and cash flows begin to dry up. In summary, institutional investors, who have better information
and resources and are better able to perceive the value of projects can facilitate the capital
necessary to fund them.
Because firms with greater institutional investor presence have lower financial
constraints, they find their cash-flow sensitivity to investments is also significantly reduced. This
finding is consistent with Agca and Mozumdar (2008) who look at U.S. Manufacturing firms and
find that institutional ownership decreases the cost wedge between internal and external
financing leading to lower investment-cash flow sensitivities. Most related to my study, Schain
and Stieble (2016) relate institutional investors’ impact on financial constraints to investments
and find that in industries which rely more heavily on external financing, institutional investors
decrease financial constraints, and this induces innovation.
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Another vast avenue of research that explores how institutional investors influence firm
decisions is the monitoring hypothesis which describes that institutional investors provide value
added monitoring services to the firms in which they invest. Pound (1988) explains that
institutional investors and corporate value are positively related because institutional investors
are large enough to benefit from their monitoring activity, have greater expertise and are able to
monitor management at lower costs than can small, individual shareholders. Other early studies
prove that large investors have the incentive and ability to monitor firms to ensure managers are
acting in the best interest of shareholders through a number of ways, including, but not limited
to, informal conversations and proxy votes (Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 and
1997). Black (1992) shows that institutional shareholders lower monitoring costs by using their
informational advantages to better collect and analyze firm decisions. In addition to monitoring
firm decisions, large institutional investors have substantial voting power allowing them to
assume an active role and directly influence manager decisions. Past literature demonstrates how
active institutional investors use their power to influence management to modify their
governance structures and operating decisions to be more in line with shareholders’ goals (Smith,
1996; Strickland, Wiles, and Zennery, 1996; Wahal, 1996). Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988)
presents evidence that institutional investors vote more actively on antitakeover amendments
than do other shareholders. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) find a significantly positive relation
between institutional ownership and stockholder wealth effects of different types of antitakeover
charter amendments, and McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive relationship between
institutional ownership and Tobin’s q; both studies support the monitoring hypothesis. Hartzell
and Starks (2000) discuss that institutional investors can directly influence firms by instigating a
change, or they can indirectly influence firms by choosing to sell their shares rather than trying
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to promote a change in the firm, sometimes referred to as the exit strategy. An institutional
investor selling their shares could cause “downward price pressure due to supply-demand effects,
information signals to other investors, and changes in shareholder composition.” This alone is
enough to incentivize firms to act in the interest of their institutional investors. Hartzell and
Starks conclude there is a significantly negative relationship between level of executive
compensation and concentration of institutional ownership suggesting institutional investors do
in fact play a significant monitoring role in firms thereby reducing the shareholder-manager
agency problem. Demiralp et al. (2011) explain that the positive relationship found between
post-SEO announcement returns and institutional ownership suggest that institutional ownership
“serve[s] a monitoring role and improve[s] firm’s performance.” Similarly, Aggrawal et al.
(2011) determine that institutional investors promote corporate governance internationally. In
summary, there is overwhelming evidence explaining that monitoring efforts of institutional
investors positively influences firm value during normal economic environments.
One way institutional investors can monitor firms to maximize firm value is by ensuring
managers are making investment decisions in line with long-term shareholder goals. However,
early literature suggests that the market, and thus its characteristics (like ownership structure),
has no substantial effects on firm investment decisions (Modigliani and Miller, 1958.)
Supporting this idea, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) find that the stock market only
marginally affects capital expenditure, and the relationship is not a result of the stock market
providing information to managers or the costs of external financing. Instead, the relationship
between market prices and investment could be partly explained by investors pressuring
managers to make investment decisions in line with shareholder values, but it is not the dominant
force driving the results. Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993) find that managers do not
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consider market valuation of firm when making investment decisions. All of these studies
suggest that the market does not significantly impact investment decisions, and this conclusion
contradicts other literature of the time and is no longer relevant.
The economic environment has changed over the years. Better information and financial
innovation has made access to equity significantly easier, and thus it has become more important
in our economy, and its influence on investment decisions has increased. The evolution of the
literature depicts this progression in the markets. Recent literature consistently shows that market
characteristics have significant impacts on investment behavior. Jarrell and Lehn (1985) use
OLS to find a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and R&D
expenditures. Hill and Snell (1988) find a positive relationship between R&D expenditures and
concentration of equity ownership in research-intensive industries suggesting large shareholders
influence investment in R&D, and this results in greater firm profitability. Gugler et al. (2000)
conclude that firms’ investment sensitivity to cash flow decreases as market value rises and its
ability to finance with external capital improves. Baker et al. (2003) ranks firms per “equity
dependence,” and find that firms with different levels of equity dependence have different
investment-q sensitivities suggesting that the stock market does affect investment behavior.
Following this path of literature, I am interested in how characteristics of equity, namely the
ownership structure, affect investment decisions in periods of economic crisis.
In order to understand how institutional investors impact investments during periods of
economic decline, it is important to first understand how investments behave during these
periods. There are two primary observations on the relationship between long term investments
and the business cycle: First, investments are pro-cyclical. That is, during periods of economic
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distress, firms decrease their investments. Second, investments are counter-cyclical; during
periods of economic distress, firms increase their investments.
The theoretical explanations that dominate the current literature on the pro-cyclicality of
R&D fall into two categories: Demand-pull Argument or Financial constraints argument. The
demand-pull argument details how investments are more likely to decrease during periods of
growth. Firms only have a window of opportunity to capitalize on their innovations before
competition increases. Consequently, firms want to implement their innovations when the
economy is strong and they can realize the highest benefit. Geroski and Walters (1995) explore
the direction of the relationship between innovation and demand. They find that demand Granger
causes innovation, and that innovative activity fluctuates pro-cyclically. Barlevy (2007) explains
the short-sightedness of entrepreneurs results in increased innovation during booms rather than
recessions. He explains that firms decide to invest in R&D based on the benefits it will receive
from such innovation. During recessions, the profits of R&D are overly-discounted and do not
reflect the future advantages of today’s investments when the economy improves; as a result,
firms under invest in R&D during recessions. Fatas (2000) explores how business cycles alter
the growth process. He explains that recessionary periods are characterized by low demand and
thus low incentives to innovate. Because innovation decreases during recessions, the postrecessionary period is plagued by stagnant productivity. Dangl and Wu (2013) analyze
aggregate capital growth rate from physical investments over the business cycle. The authors
observe then create a model to reflect the strong evidence of asymmetry where aggregate
corporate investments fall much faster than they recover. Furthermore, the growth rate of capital
is “more sensitive to bad signals in good times than to good signals in bad times.”
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One byproduct of shrinking demand that characterizes periods of recession is that it leads
to decreases in cash flows. As the internal financing dries up from decreased cash flows, so too
do investments. During recessions, firms typically become more financially constrained. Thus,
one would expect to see R&D expenditures fall (Fazzari et al., 1988; Allayannis and Mozumdar,
2004; Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004; Cleary, Povel and Raith, 2007.) Hall (1992)
adds to the literature when they conclude that firms do not finance R&D with debt, and profit is
positively related to R&D likely due to the cash flows effect and not the demand effect.
Himmelberg and Peterson (1994) use a different methodology that leads them to the same results
confirming a positive relationship between internal financing and both R&D and physical
investments.
However, literature also suggests we could observe an increase in R&D investments
during the financial crisis. The theoretical explanation that dominates the current literature on
the counter-cyclicality of R&D is the opportunity cost argument. The basis of the theory
explaining why firms increase their R&D during recessions derives from Schumpeter’s cyclical
theory of economic development which describes recessions as periods of correction where old
processes are replaced with new to keep the economy on an equilibrium trajectory. In these
recessionary periods, profitability falls, and as a result, the opportunity cost of investments fall
spurring an increase in investment activity. Because of decreasing opportunity costs of R&D
investment—the sales or profits that could have been realized if funds were appropriated in the
direction of production instead of investment—firms will increase their R&D. Hall (1991)
explains that during recessions, firms must decide between producing goods or reorganizing. He
states that “optimal capital utilization declines in recessions” making it relatively cheaper to
transfer capital from producing to research and development. Caballero and Hammour (1991)
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describe recessions as periods of “cleansing” where old methods are scrapped and new methods
are instilled to promote productivity—a process the authors refer to as creative destruction.
However, one issue remains. Even if the opportunity cost of investing is falling making the
optimal level of investment expenditure increase, the firm must have the financing to increase its
investments. Lopez-Garcia (2012) test the opportunity cost theory on French firms and find that
in the absence of credit constraints, R&D investments are countercyclical. However, when credit
constraints are present, they hinder R&D investment. Arvantis and Woerter (2013) categorize
manufacturing firms in Switzerland based on their R&D investment behavior during economic
fluctuations and explore which characteristics are present in different these different types of
firms. They find that 42% of firms invest pro-cyclically and 17% invest counter-cyclically with
the rest showing no systematic behavior. Furthermore, the authors find that firms with larger
sales shares of R&D investments that are less frequently cooperating with universities, and are
not exposed to intensive price competition tend to demonstrate counter-cyclical R&D investment
behavior. Beneito et al. (2015) confirm that investments in R&D in Spanish manufacturing firms
are also countercyclical for firms which are not financially constrained, but credit constrained
firms’ investment in R&D is less counter-cyclical and sometimes pro-cyclical. The authors’ most
interesting implication is that owner types affect the relationship between R&D and the business
cycle. They find that family-owned firms and group-affiliated owned firms are considerably less
dependent on being credit constrained and invest in R&D in a counter-cyclical fashion; firms
with public capital participation do not display strong evidence of counter-cyclicality.
Knudsen and Lien (2013) reconcile the theories of pro-cyclicality and counter-cyclicality
of investments when they explain that all recessions are marked by reductions in demand and
reductions in access to credit. The authors explain that recessionary characteristics affect
12

investments differently. As demand decreases, the firm produces less and the opportunity costs
of using idle labor resources in R&D decreases resulting in an increase in R&D. As internal
financing dries up and access to credit decreases, financing their projects becomes more
expensive and tougher, resulting in a decrease in R&D. Thus, the ultimate change in a firm’s
R&D during a recession depends on whether the opportunity cost effect or cash flow effect is
greater. Knudsen and Lien find that financial constraints “have a stronger negative effect on
R&D investments than the positive effect of reduced opportunity costs…similarly R&D
investments are less sensitive to changes in demand than physical investments, due to the higher
adjustment cost and the opportunity cost effect.”

3.

METHODOLOGY AND DATASET

3.1 Estimation Procedure
Using regression analysis to explore how the presence of institutional investors affects
investments during the Global Financial Crisis has its share of difficulties. I begin by employing
OLS regression. However, there are two main reasons why this model can lead to biased
coefficients. I correct for these biases in the following ways.
First, firms in different industries have very different needs for investment. One obvious
example, manufacturing firms have a greater need for capital investments whereas tech firms
tend to be more R&D intensive. Furthermore, the value placed on these different types of firms
also varies dramatically amongst industries. As a result, it is important to control for any industry
effects. To do this, I run my models using Industry Fixed Effects. When doing so, I use the Ftest of joint significance of the fixed effects intercepts to test the null hypothesis that all the fixed
13

effects intercepts are zero. If the null is rejected, the fixed effects method is more appropriate.
For my regressions, the p-values associated to the F-statistic and the Chi-square statistic are
0.0000, which provides strong evidence against the null hypothesis that the fixed effects are all
equal to each other. This suggests that there is unobserved heterogeneity and fixed effects needs
to be used. This makes sense intuitively because the variables being considered are time-varying.
To ensure the fixed effects model is more appropriate than the random effects model, I also use
the Hausman test. When performing the Hausman test on my regressions, I receive p-values
equal to 0 suggesting individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors indicating that
fixed effects is preferred.
Secondly, OLS fails to control for self-selection bias that is present in the study of
institutional investors. In this paper, I am exploring if institutional investors play a role in firms’
investment decisions and subsequent performance during periods of financial crisis. However, I
must also consider the process through which institutional investors choose the firms in which
they invest. That is, investors may choose to allocate their investments to firms that follow a
specific high or low investment strategy. For example, firms which invest heavily in R&D are
deemed riskier because there is high uncertainty surrounding this type of investment. Because of
this, more risk averse investors may choose to not invest in these types of firms. Even if
investors do not directly choose firms based on investment strategies, they may choose firms
based on other factors that affect investments, such as a firm’s performance. To account for this
self-selection bias, I run my models use Heckman two stage least squares with instrumental
variables. In the first stage, I use a probit model to test the likelihood that institutional investors
choose firms based on investment levels, performance, and other factors. A probit model is
needed as it assumes that the error term follows a standard normal distribution. Following the
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first stage, the inverse mills ratio is calculated and then included as an independent variable in
the second stage. In the second stage, I test how institutional investors impact investments
during the financial crisis while using the inverse mills ratio to correct for self-selection. I also
separately test how institutional investors impact performance during the financial crisis.

3.2 Variables
3.2.1 Performance Variables
Following McConnell and Servaes (1990), I measure firm performance using Tobin’s Q where Q
equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets. I use Fama and French’s
definition of book value of equity. Book value of equity equals the book value of stockholders’
equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit, minus the redemption value
of preferred stock. (The Compustat variables to measure book value of equity are BE=
SEQQ+TXDITCQ-PSTKRQ). The book value of assets is the compustat variable “Total
Assets,” and Market value of equity equals the product of “Total shares outstanding” and
“Closing Price” (or CSHOQ x PRCCQ). Putting these together, I am able to calculate Q which
reflects a firm’s value and growth opportunities.
Q = (ATQ – BE + ME) / ATQ.
3.2.2 Investment Behavior Variables
To analyze if institutional investors influence investment behavior, I look at two Compustat
variables which represent the ways in which managers invest- Capital expenditure and Research
and development expenditures. Similar to Cho (1998), I normalize both expenditure types by the
book value of assets.
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Capital expenditures and R&D expenditures are ways in which a firm can directly invest
in itself. Capital expenditures (CAPXY) represents cash funds used for additions to the
company's property, plant and equipment. The Compustat quarterly capital expenditure variable
is accumulated year to date. Thus, I create CAPXYQ which measures expenditures on capital
investments each quarter. Capital expenditures are used to purchase new assets or update old
assets which will help make the business more efficient and profitable shortly after installation.
In addition, if the capital purchased is deemed a failure, that is it does not ultimately benefit the
firm, the firm could re-sell the physical property and recoup some of its losses. Because of the
nature of capital expenditures, they are considered to be less-risky than other forms of long term
investments.
Research and development expenditures (XRDY) includes all costs incurred during the
year that relates to the development of new products or services. Again, the Compustat quarterly
research and development expenditure variable is year to date; I create XRDYQ which measures
the expenditures on research and development investments for each quarter. Unlike capital
expenditures where the product of the costs is a tangible good, the product of research and
development expenditures is often knowledge or technology. In addition, much of the cost of
R&D is wages to researchers who are exploring and developing these new ideas which are not
immediately profitable. It can take months or years for a product to come to fruition from the
R&D expenditures; improving short term earnings are not the goal with these investments. In
addition, there is a high degree of uncertainty with R&D output. Because R&D is non-rival, once
the knowledge is created, many firms can free-ride from its accumulation. To benefit from its
creation, R&D firms are often very secretive about the projects they are working on. In addition,
if the research is not successful, or the firm loses a researcher, there is no ability to recover
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losses. Because of this, R&D investments are considered to be much riskier. Because of the
differing nature of capital expenditures and research and development expenditures, I expect that
institutional investors treat them differently, and so I explore each investment type
independently.
3.2.3 Institutional Investor Variables
To analyze the impact of institutional investor presence on firm performance and investor
behavior, I use four proxies for institutional investor presence derived from Demiralp et al,
(2011). First, I calculate the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional
investors.
Percii =

# 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔

The institutional ownership percentages do not include institutions which own less than
$100million in assets under management. Furthermore, database errors permit percentages to
be greater than 100%. To correct for this, I delete any observation where percentage of shares
outstanding owned by institutional investors is greater than 1.
Afterwards, I use a dummy variable to split firms where percentage owned by
institutional investors is greater than zero into quartiles where the higher the dummy variable, the
higher the percentage of shares outstanding are owned by institutions. Firms where dummy
equals “0” have no institutional investors. Firms where the dummy variable equals “1” have
institutional ownership where the percentage of shares owned by institutions are in the bottom
25% of percentage shares owned by institutional investors. Firms denoted by a dummy variable
“4” have institutional ownership where the percentage of shares owned by institutions is in the
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top 25%. Firms where the dummy variable equals “2,” “3,” fill out the middle quartile range. I
also create quintile variables to see if my results are sensitive to small changes in the variable
definition, and I find the same results whether I use quartile or quintiles. As a result, I only
discuss the quartile institutional investor dummy variable.
Last, I calculate two concentration variables. The first, called “herf”, is a Herfindahlstyle index that equals the sum of squares of the proportions of the firm’s shares held by
institutional investors, j, for firm, i, during period t.
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠

Herfi,t = ∑ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 2 = ∑(𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔)2
The second concentration variable is “C5,” and it is the fractional ownership of the five largest
institutions for each quarter.
C5 =

# 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡𝑜𝑝 5 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔

3.2.4 Crisis Period Variables
In this dissertation, I study the impact institutional investors have on investment expenditures
and subsequent firm performance during the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis. The Global
Financial Crisis is a unique event that allows us to explore this relationship. Kuppaswamy and
Villalonga (2010) explain that the early quarters of the financial crisis represent “an ideal setting
for studying the effects of corporate finance on investment” because the crisis is contained in the
credit market where it originated from the descent of the consumer finance (housing) market. At
this point, the deteriorating economy is not a result of corporate finance or business/economic
fundamentals, thus any change we see in investment behavior is not because of a worsening in
the availability of quality investments, but because of a reduction in liquidity. Like
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Kuppaswamy and Villalonga, I break the recessionary period into two distinct crisis periods: the
financial crisis and the economic crisis. I create a dummy variable “fincrisis” which equals 1 if
the quarter is between Q42007 and Q32008, otherwise “fincrisis” equals 0. I create a dummy
variable “econcrisis” which equals 1 if the quarter is between Q42008 and Q22009, otherwise
“econcrisis” equals 0. However, my measure varies only slightly as I coincide the beginning of
the financial crisis period and the end of the economic crisis period with the National Bureau of
Economic Research’s definition of the global recession.
3.2.5 Control Variables
Borrowing from past literature, I use a number of variables to control for different firm
characteristics in my various models. To control for performance, I include leverage and firm
size. To control for characteristics affecting investments, I include liquidity, volatility of profits,
and salesgrowth. Definitions for each of these variables can be found in Appendix A.
3.2.6 Instrumental Variable
The Heckman 2SLS model requires an instrumental variable for institutional investor presence in
my first stage regression. Following Karpavicius and Yu (2014), I include a S&P500 dummy
variable to instrument for institutional investor presence. The authors argue that S&P500 is not
affected by a firm’s financing policies or its expenditures on investments but it is positively
correlated with institutional ownership.
3.2.7 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the Descriptive Statistics for my variables of interest
from different samples. Panel A displays the descriptive statistics for the full sample which
includes both firms with institutional investor presence as well as firms with no institutional
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investor presence. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for institutional investor firms only,
and Panel C presents the descriptive statistics for firms with no institutional investor presence at
all. All samples include quarterly data spanning from Quarter 1 of 2003 through Quarter 2 of
2009. Table 2 shows summary statistics for the top 10 industries where institutional investors
have the greatest presence. It is apparent in this table that firm-level statistics in each industry
vary by institutional investor presence.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for full sample, firms with institutional investor presence, and
firms with no institutional investor presence.
Panel A: Full Sample
N
MIN
MAX
MEAN
STD
CapEx
116402.0000
-0.1389
0.2901
0.0166
0.0400
R&D
127735.0000
-0.1891
0.6043
0.0196
0.0652
Q
107335.0000
0.2342
281.1128
6.8900
23.3837
PercII
127735.0000
0.0000
0.9919
0.1134
0.2465
Herf
127735.0000
0.0000
0.1579
0.0057
0.0152
C5
127735.0000
0.0000
0.6748
0.0591
0.1202
Panel B: Institutional Investor Firm Sample
CapEx
41337.0000
-0.1389
0.2901
0.0151
0.0338
R&D
44026.0000
-0.1891
0.6043
0.0181
0.0570
Q
40006.0000
0.2342
281.1128
3.4376
10.1505
PercII
44026.0000
0.000001
0.9919
0.3290
0.3245
Herf
44026.0000
0.0000
0.1579
0.0166
0.0221
C5
44026.0000
0.0000
0.6748
0.1714
0.1505
Panel C: No Institutional Investor Firm Sample
CapEx
75065.0000
-0.1389
0.2901
0.0174
0.0430
R&D
83709.0000
-0.1891
0.6043
0.0203
0.0691
Q
67329.0000
0.2342
281.1128
8.9414
28.2700
This Table presents summary statistics non-financial and non-utility American firms
with institutional investor presence. It includes three panels: Full sample, Firms with
institutional investor presence, and firms without institutional investor presence. The
variables are Tobin’s Q; Capital expenditures as a percent of total assets; R&D
expenditures as a percent of Total Assets; Percentage of shares outstanding owned by
institutional investors; Herfindahl-style concentration index measuring the concentration
of ownership; and the percent of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5
institutional investors in that firm.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for industries with top 10 institutional investor presence

sic2

N.Obs

Q

Capital
Expenditures as
% of Total
Assets

R&D
Expenditures
as a % of
Total Assets Total Assets

% Shares
owned by
Institutional
Investors

% Shares
owned by Top
Herf
5 Institutional
Concentration Investors

Full Sample
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence
High Institutional Investor Presence

40
40
40

Transportation, Railroad

168
97
71

1.1410
1.0434
1.2029

1.6479%
1.5862%
1.7210%

0.0000%
0.0000%
0.0000%

20748.1637 29.6903%
21682.6373 0.0041%
19550.4582 70.2474%

0.0134
0.0000
0.0318

11.8635%
0.0038%
28.0661%

Full Sample
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence
High Institutional Investor Presence

56
56
56

Retail, Apparel and Accessiories

752
482
270

1.8404
1.6024
2.2281

1.9276%
1.8574%
2.0477%

0.0000%
0.0000%
0.0000%

955.9978
844.4503
1153.4782

26.1693%
0.7914%
71.4735%

0.0122
0.0006
0.0329

11.3847%
0.7337%
30.3986%

Full Sample
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence
High Institutional Investor Presence

52
52
52

Retail, Building Materials

98
66
32

2.4641
1.2378
4.4184

1.8941%
1.8609%
1.9512%

0.0000%
0.0000%
0.0000%

1865.4175
907.4569
3721.4662

25.9506%
0.1440%
79.1766%

0.0072
0.0000
0.0221

8.3341%
0.1436%
25.2269%

Full Sample
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence
High Institutional Investor Presence

41
41
41

Transportation, Local Highway Transportation 125
87
38

1.4272
1.2207
1.7904

1.4592%
2.0946%
0.3087%

0.0000%
0.0000%
0.0000%

1272.8437
1377.4414
1049.8856

22.0358%
0.7793%
70.7020%

0.0118
0.0002
0.0383

11.0928%
0.6815%
34.9292%

Full Sample
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence
High Institutional Investor Presence

31
31
31

Leather

150
111
39

1.7618
1.2055
3.0061

0.6903%
0.5999%
0.9312%

0.1734%
0.1272%
0.3050%

341.9866
272.9433
538.4944

21.7016%
3.5240%
73.4381%

0.0088
0.0013
0.0302

10.1393%
3.1819%
29.9412%

Full Sample
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence
High Institutional Investor Presence

46
46
46

Pipelines

164
97
67

1.4693
1.3600
1.5656

1.5357%
1.6916%
1.3287%

0.0000%
0.0000%
0.0000%

1541.2090
1568.0530
1502.7459

21.2695%
1.9837%
49.1909%

0.0112
0.0003
0.0270

12.5260%
1.0929%
29.0784%

Full Sample
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence
High Institutional Investor Presence

72
72
72

Personal Services

224
150
74

1.8782
2.1194
1.4774

1.4024%
1.2968%
1.6046%

0.4442%
0.6634%
0.0000%

272.1014
248.8352
318.6340

20.7947%
0.7844%
61.3563%

0.0128
0.0003
0.0379

12.2683%
0.6833%
35.7515%

Full Sample
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence
High Institutional Investor Presence

16
16
16

Heavy Construction

427
309
118

4.0652
5.2827
1.5981

1.3381%
1.3542%
1.3011%

0.0571%
0.0541%
0.0649%

792.2295
786.1199
808.1766

19.5744%
0.8451%
68.6198%

0.0101
0.0003
0.0356

9.2280%
0.7667%
31.3850%

Full Sample
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence
High Institutional Investor Presence

26
26
26

Paper and Allied Products

1262
917
345

3.7428
4.9643
1.1805

1.0640%
1.1144%
0.9444%

0.3913%
0.4981%
0.1075%

2507.5058
2449.0025
2659.9536

19.1944%
0.9754%
67.6202%

0.0103
0.0004
0.0366

9.4817%
0.8097%
32.5317%

Full Sample
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence
High Institutional Investor Presence

42
42
42

Transportation, Motor Freight Transportation 672
475
197

1.5881
1.5452
1.6793

2.1193%
1.5707%
3.4086%

0.0000%
0.0000%
0.0000%

3263.0117
2519.3186
5052.4052

18.8460%
0.9313%
62.0414%

0.0077
0.0004
0.0254

8.6932%
0.8681%
27.5608%

This Table presents summary statistics for the top 10 industries of non-financial and non-utility American firms with institutional investor presence. It breaks the full sample statistics for each industry into firm-level
classifications based on the level of institutional ownership. The variables are Tobin’s Q; Capital expenditures as a percent of total assets; R&D expenditures as a percent of Total Assets; Total Assets; Percentage of shares
outstanding owned by institutional investors; Herfindahl-style concentration index measuring the concentration of ownership; and the percent of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 institutional investors in that firm.
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3.3 Models
First I explore how institutional investors impact investments during the crisis periods. As I am
interested in how institutional investors impact investments during crisis periods, I include
interaction terms which capture this effect. I run variations of the following model using the
institutional investor and investment variables discussed above.
Investment = α +𝛽1InstInv + 𝛽2Q + 𝛽3Liquidity + 𝛽4 Salesgrowth + 𝛽5Volume + 𝛽6Fincrisis
+ 𝛽7Econcrisis + 𝛽8Fincrisis x InstInv + 𝛽9Econcrisis x InstInv
“InstInv” is an abbreviation for the institutional investor variables defined in the previous
section.
In addition, I investigate why institutional investors may actively influence investment
behavior during crisis periods by exploring how a change in investments impacts firm
performance, as measured by Q, during crisis periods. I run the following model.
Tobin’s Q = α +𝛽1InstInv + 𝛽2Investments + 𝛽3Leverage + 𝛽4 Log(Total Assets) +
𝛽5Fincrisis + 𝛽6Econcrisis + 𝛽7Fincrisis x Investment + 𝛽8Econcrisis x Investment
Last, I investigate how institutional investors impact firm performance during crisis
periods. I am interested in the effects provided by my interaction terms “crisis period x
institutional investor.”
Tobin’s Q = α +𝛽1InstInv + 𝛽2Investments + 𝛽3Leverage + 𝛽4 Log(Total Assets) +
𝛽5Fincrisis + 𝛽6Econcrisis + 𝛽7Fincrisis x InstInv + 𝛽8Econcrisis x InstInv
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3.4 Dataset
My data consists of quarterly data of firms obtained from Compustat covering the period
between the first quarter of 2003 through the second quarter of 2009. My data begins in 2003 to
avoid the 2001 dotcom bubble and subsequent recovery. I delete all firms which do not have at
least 1 year (4 quarters) of data. I gather institutional investor information from Thomson
Reuters for the firms listed on Compustat. Thomson Reuters contains ownership information by
institutional managers with $100million or more in assets under management as reported on
Form 13F with the SEC. I delete observations that are financial firms or utility companies
because they are subjected to different operating and reporting restrictions. In addition, the
financial industry is the center of the financial crisis, so I expect their business fundamentals to
change more dramatically and earlier than other firms during the financial crisis period. I also
delete duplicate observations of firms undergoing a shift in fiscal calendar. These duplicate
observations are deleted if the observation being reported is not for the current calendar period of
the report. Next, I delete observations where institutional ownership is greater than 100% due to
database errors. Next, I match institutional investor firms with non-institutional investor firms
based on industry and size. Last, I winsorize the institutional ownership variables at the top and
bottom 1% level. This leaves me with a total of 127,735 observations across 9,206 firms.
4

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this paper, I look at two different types of long term investments: capital expenditures and
R&D expenditures. Both types of long term investments are believed to improve a firm’s longrun value, but they could affect value very differently during a period of macroeconomic
financial distress (McConnell and Muscarella, 1985; Chung, Wright and Charoenwong, 1998;
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Jaffee, 1986; Boulding and Staelin, 1995). Because of their differences, I look at how
institutional investors affect capital expenditures and R&D investments separately.
4.1 Capital Expenditures
Capital expenditures are used to purchase new assets or update old assets which will help make
the business more efficient and profitable shortly after installation. In addition, if the capital
purchased is deemed a failure, that is it does not ultimately benefit the firm, the firm could re-sell
the physical property and recoup some of its losses. Because of the nature of capital
expenditures, they are considered to be less-risky than other forms of long term investments. It
is not immediately clear if capital expenditures would improve or hurt firm value during a
recession. Capital expenditures could immediately benefit firms by improving efficiency, so
how this investment effects firm value to investors depends on which carries more weight: the
cost to acquire the capital or the benefit from its purchase? As capital expenditures have low risk
and could potentially improve short term firm value, institutional investors are less opposed to
this type of long run investment during periods of economic uncertainty. As a result, capital
expenditures are a good choice when studying how institutional investors affect investments
during the liquidity squeeze of the financial crisis.
Since institutional investors help mitigate financial constraints (Agca and Mozumdar,
2008; Alvarez et al., 2016; Schain and Stieble, 2016; Ismail and Krishnaswami, 2017 working
paper; Krishnaswami et al., 1999; Denis and Milhov, 2002; Berger and Udell, 1998, then
intuition suggests that when liquidity is squeezed, firms with greater institutional investor
presence are affected by the credit crunch on a significantly smaller scale. Thus, I posit the
mitigation of financial constraints by institutional investors allows firms with greater institutional
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investor presence to continue financing their long-term investments, while their peers must
decrease their investments on a greater scale. That is, I expect to observe
1.

Firms with higher levels of institutional investor presence show less variation in capital

investments from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period relative to their peers with low- and
no- institutional investor presence.
I find that, in the pre-crisis period, there is a negative relationship between institutional investors
and capital expenditures. In addition, capital expenditures generally increase during the financial
crisis period and decrease during the economic crisis period. The effect of institutional investors
on capital expenditures during the crisis periods is sensitive to the model employed. The OLS
model does not find any difference in capital expenditures during the crisis periods among
institutional investor levels or concentration.
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Table 3

Intercept
Dumhi
Dumii4
PercIi
Q
Liquidity
Salesgrowth
Volatility
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis*dumhi
Econcrisis*dumhi
Fincrisis*dumii4
Econcrisis*dumii4
Fincrisis*percii
Econcrisis*percii
R-Square

OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = CapEx
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
0.0150 84.6497 *
0.0152 78.3334 *
-0.0014 -3.9252 *
-0.0005 -4.7193 *
0.0000
0.0020
0.0025
0.0000
0.0018
-0.0019
0.0006
0.0011

0.0035

0.7544
5.4284
12.1627
-0.1663
4.4285
-4.1001
0.6731
1.0946

*
*
*
*

0.0000
0.0021
0.0025
0.0000
0.0019
-0.0020

0.7365
5.5100
12.1007
-0.2685
4.2047
-3.8965

0.0001
0.0003

0.2215
0.9664

0.0036

*
*
*
*

Estimate T-Value
0.0150 84.5793 *

-0.0022
0.0000
0.0020
0.0025
0.0000
0.0018
-0.0020

-4.0864
0.7619
5.4412
12.1464
-0.1693
4.3265
-4.1523

0.0012
0.0018
0.0035

0.8926
1.1866

*
*
*
*
*

* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%. Dumii4
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors where 1 equals the bottom 25%
and 4 equals the top 25%. Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls
between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net
income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = standard deviation of the
changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in
sales from previous quarter.
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Table 4

Intercept
Herf
C5
Q
Liquidity
Salesgrowth
Volatility
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis*herf
Econcrisis*herf
Fincrisis*c5
Econcrisis*c5
R-Square

Estimate
0.0151
-0.0524
0.0000
0.0020
0.0025
0.0000
0.0018
-0.0018
0.0187
0.0199

0.0038

OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = CapEx
T-Value
Estimate T-Value
88.2327 *
0.0152 84.3180
-5.6832 *
-0.0070 -6.1771
0.7029
0.0000
0.6952
5.4552 *
0.0021
5.5819
12.1304 *
0.0025 12.0467
-0.2130
0.0000 -0.2963
4.6592 *
0.0018
4.3857
-4.0077 *
-0.0019 -3.9477
0.9172
0.8902
0.0018
0.6968
0.0028
0.9244
0.0039

*
*
*
*
*
*

* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership structure. C5 is the
percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity =
(Net income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility =
standard deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items divided by
assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from previous quarter.

After controlling for industry effects, I find a weakly positive relationship between
institutional investors and capital expenditures. While the general trend is to decrease capital
expenditures during the economic crisis, firms with higher institutional investor presence and
concentration decrease their capital expenditures on a significantly smaller scale relative to lowand no- institutional investor firms. This finding is consistent with institutional investors
providing liquidity benefits to the firms in which they invest: as the economy slows, firms with
greater institutional investor presence are better able to continue to fund their investments.
However, because this occurs during the economic crisis period, it is more likely that this
behavior is a result of monitoring. That is, we find that institutional investors moderate
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decreases in capital expenditure during the the economic crisis rather than the financial crisis.
The financial crisis is a period of contained declining liquidity where problems were limited to
the banking system. The economic crisis period is plagued by declining business fundamentals
and falling investment quality resulting in a broad decrease in investments. However,
institutional investors alleviate declining firm health and actively monitor firm decisions to
ensure managers continue investing at efficient levels. As a result, I conclude that my industry
fixed effects findings are most consistent with monitoring hypothesis.
Table 5

Dumhi
Dumii4
PercIi
Q
Liquidity
Salesgrowth
Volatility
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis*dumhi
Econcrisis*dumhi
Fincrisis*dumii4
Econcrisis*dumii4
Fincrisis*percii
Econcrisis*percii
R-Square

INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS
Dependent Variable = CapEx
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
0.0006
1.8426 ***
0.0002
1.6765 ***
0.0000
-0.0006
0.0019
0.0000
0.0004
-0.0038
0.0004
0.0014

0.1715

1.4117
-1.7457 ***
10.2248 *
0.2411
0.9499
-8.7869 *
0.5061
1.6109

0.0000
-0.0006
0.0019
0.0000
0.0003
-0.0040

1.4186
-1.7499 ***
10.2273 *
0.2747
0.6822
-8.5782 *

0.0002
0.0005

0.7243
2.0701 **

0.1716

Estimate T-Value

0.0007
0.0000
-0.0006
0.0019
0.0000
0.0003
-0.0039

1.4904
1.3997
-1.7388 ***
10.2230 *
0.2360
0.8942
-9.0119 *

0.0008
0.0029
0.1716

0.6368
2.0817 **

* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%. Dumii4
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors where 1 equals the bottom 25%
and 4 equals the top 25%. Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls
between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net
income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = standard deviation of the
changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in
sales from previous quarter.
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Table 6

Herf
C5
Q
Liquidity
Salesgrowth
Volatility
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis*herf
Econcrisis*herf
Fincrisis*c5
Econcrisis*c5
R-Square

INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = CapEx
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
-0.0033 -0.3911
0.0004
0.3960
0.0000
1.4113
0.0000
1.4176
-0.0005 -1.5606
-0.0006 -1.6289
0.0019 10.1293 *
0.0019 10.1644 *
0.0000
0.1324
0.0000
0.1798
0.0004
1.0695
0.0004
0.9478
-0.0037 -8.9719 *
-0.0039 -8.7898 *
0.0091
0.4920
0.0308
1.5044
0.0011
0.4749
0.0049
1.7741 ***
0.1714
0.1715

* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership structure. C5 is the
percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity =
(Net income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility =
standard deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items divided by
assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from previous quarter.

Last, I employ the Heckman model to see if there is a self-selection bias. For the
institutional investor presence model, the lambda coefficient (the coefficient of the Inverse Mills
Ratio) is barely statistically different than zero at the 10% level indicating selectivity is not
strong. This suggests that the more appropriate model is one which does not control for
selection bias, such as fixed effects. However, the institutional investor concentration model
shows that self-selection is present. Institutional investors choose to be more concentrated the
higher the Q value and the lower the Financial Constraints, but they do not choose to increase
concentration based on capital expenditure behavior. In the second stage, we find that
institutional investor concentration has no effect on capital expenditure behavior during the crisis
periods.
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Table 7
HECKMAN 2SLS MODEL
1st Stage Dependent
1st Stage Dependent
Variable = Lag
Variable = Lag (Dumhi)
(DumC5hi)
Estmate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
Intercept
-3.5989 -77.2737 *
-2.0786 -87.8275 *
Lag (Dumsp500)
0.4077
9.4504 *
0.2981
7.6803 *
Lag (CapEx)
0.0000 -0.5735
0.0000 -0.7478
Lag (Q)
0.0092
6.8407 *
0.0021
2.5807 *
Lag (Saindex)
-0.7890 -52.3246 *
-0.4526 -54.9726 *
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = CapEx
Intercept
0.0154
4.2659 *
0.0238 12.3655 *
DumHi
0.0017
0.6737
DumC5hi
-0.0033 -3.2452 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi
0.0037
0.7783
Econcrisis * Dumhi
0.0067
1.5943
Fincrisis * DumC5hi
-0.0034 -1.3101
Econcrisis * DumC5hi
0.0000 -0.0029
Fincrisis
-0.0011 -0.2434
0.0049
2.0316 **
Econcrisis
-0.0036 -0.9244
-0.0008 -0.2742
Q
0.0005
1.3616
0.0002
2.7752 *
Liquidity
0.0212
4.0662 *
0.0068
4.4869 *
Salesgrowth
0.0018
1.6374
0.0023
3.9953 *
Volatility
0.0015
1.6152
-0.0005 -1.3907
Lambda
-0.0028 -1.8798 ***
-0.0057 -4.5503 *
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional
investors is in the top 50%, otherwise Dumhi equals 0. Dumc5hi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the
percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 institutional investors is in the top 50%, otherwise
Dumc5hi equals 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1
if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net income + depreciation) /
total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = standard
deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items
divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from previous quarter. Sa-Index is a proxy for
financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). DumSP500 is a dummy variable which
equals 1 if the firm is included in the S&P500 for that quarter, otherwise it equals 0. The first stage variables
are lagged by 1 year.

For institutional investor presence, the most appropriate model is the industry fixed effects
model, and it provides evidence that firms with higher levels of institutional investor presence
show less variation in capital investments from the pre-crisis period to the economic crisis period
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relative to their peers with low- and no- institutional investor presence. This finding is consistent
with institutional investors monitoring the firms in which they invest: as the economy slows,
firms with greater institutional investor presence continue to efficiently fund their investments.
It is generally accepted that long-term capital investments improve efficiency and
profitability which increases firm value to investors. If capital investments do not expect to have
these benefits, then it is unlikely that the manager would purchase the asset. Thus, I expect to
find that if firms which maintain their long-term capital investments during the financial crisis
are better able to maintain their firm value.
2.

Firms which increase (do not decrease) their capital investments during the financial

crisis have lower variation in performance from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period.
All models show that a change in capital investments during the crises periods do not
result in any change in performance. Thus, continuing to invest in capital improves firm value
even during crisis periods. This demonstrates that institutional investors are incentivized to
encourage firms to maintain their capital investments during economic downturns.
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Table 8

Intercept
Dumhi
Dumii4
PercII
CapEx
Leverage
Log (Total Assets)
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis * CapEx
Econcrisis * CapEx
R-Square

OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
7.9071 74.3214 *
7.7771 72.9131 *
1.9755 14.6136 *
0.3882 10.1737 *
10.4898
7.3593 *
4.2708 276.5320 *
-1.5571 -71.7926 *
-1.2348 -7.9880 *
-1.8823 -10.8566 *
0.7894
0.2436
-0.3688 -0.0922
0.5500

10.2966
7.2183 *
4.2783 277.1634 *
-1.5221 -70.2324 *
-1.2314 -7.9615 *
-1.8809 -10.8413 *
0.7991
0.2465
-0.3252 -0.0812
0.5495

Estimate T-Value
7.9626 74.7725 *

3.5454 16.7341 *
10.6306
7.4604 *
4.2641 275.8286 *
-1.5877 -72.1684 *
-1.2269 -7.9395 *
-1.8699 -10.7881 *
0.8646
0.2669
-0.3474 -0.0868
0.5503

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%. Dumii4
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% and 4
equals the top 25%. Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market
value of the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total
assets.
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Table 9

Intercept
Herf
C5
CapEx
Leverage
Log (Total Assets)
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis * CapEx
Econcrisis * CapEx
R-Square

OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate
7.8567 73.8340 *
7.8415
25.9825
7.9037 *
4.3399
10.0711
7.0609 *
10.3294
4.2804 277.3028 *
4.2781
-1.4878 -70.7884 *
-1.5162
-1.2544 -8.1087 *
-1.2487
-1.9198 -11.0655 *
-1.9063
0.7396
0.2281
0.7846
-0.2641 -0.0659
-0.2836
0.5493
0.5495

T-Value
73.7018 *
10.2547
7.2407
277.1505
-70.6602
-8.0739
-10.9900
0.2420
-0.0708

*
*
*
*
*
*

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership
structure. C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors.
Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls
between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value
of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current
debt) / total assets.
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Table 10

Dumhi
Dumii4
PercII
CapEx
Leverage
Log (Total Assets)
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis * CapEx
Econcrisis * CapEx
R-Square

INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
2.1611 15.8662 *
0.4503 11.6852 *
6.3294
4.1864 *
4.2519 271.7574 *
-1.6410 -70.0298 *
-1.2859 -8.3230 *
-1.9800 -11.4080 *
1.0422
0.3221
0.2312
0.0579
0.5524

6.3038
4.1670 *
4.2596 272.3869 *
-1.6070 -68.6106 *
-1.2791 -8.2746 *
-1.9725 -11.3577 *
1.0473
0.3235
0.2457
0.0615
0.5519

Estimate T-Value

3.8866 18.1894 *
6.3488
4.2008 *
4.2442 271.0027 *
-1.6757 -70.5776 *
-1.2790 -8.2816 *
-1.9694 -11.3512 *
1.1241
0.3476
0.2730
0.0684
0.5527

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%. Dumii4
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% and
4 equals the top 25%. Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market
value of the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) /
total assets.

Table 11
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate
Herf
29.6141
8.9514 *
C5
4.9787
CapEx
6.3425
4.1914 *
6.3662
Leverage
4.2626 272.5873 *
4.2598
Log (Total Assets)
-1.5646 -68.7733 *
-1.5985
Fincrisis
-1.3024 -8.4222 *
-1.2993
Econcrisis
-2.0114 -11.5790 *
-2.0019
Fincrisis * CapEx
0.9442
0.2916
1.0199
Econcrisis * CapEx
0.2545
0.0637
0.2853
R-Square
0.5516
0.5519

T-Value
11.6596
4.2082
272.4107
-68.9240
-8.4051
-11.5282
0.3151
0.0714

*
*
*
*
*
*

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership
structure. C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional
investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if
the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of the
firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long
term debt + current debt) / total assets.
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Table 12
HECKMAN 2SLS MODEL
1st Stage Dependent
1st Stage Dependent
Variable = Lag
Variable = Lag (DumHi)
(DumC5Hi)
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
Intercept
-3.4744 -78.5912 *
-1.9345 -89.2155 *
Lag(Dumsp500)
0.3933
9.0977 *
0.2693
6.9897 *
Lag(adjcapxyq
0.0000 -0.6004
0.0000 -0.7747
Lag(Q)
0.0097
8.4736 *
0.0032
5.1755 *
Lag(Saindex)
-0.7563 -52.4216 *
-0.4240 -55.5036 *
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = Q
Intercept
-0.3254 -0.5225
8.3919 11.2024 *
Dumhi
0.4770
3.2618 *
DumC5hi
-0.3180 -1.5013
CapEx
1.6422
1.0673
7.2020
2.7277 *
Fincrisis
0.0426
0.3896
-0.3792 -1.7119 ***
Econcrisis
-0.5801 -4.8467 *
-1.3596 -5.5214 *
Fincrisis * CapEx
-2.9512 -0.9311
3.3989
0.6001
Econcrisis * CapEx
1.2072
0.3771
2.9038
0.4310
Leverage
0.5471
4.8817 *
4.2381 109.7055 *
Log(Total Assets)
-0.0696 -1.6805 ***
-0.8084 -16.1912 *
Lambda
1.3331
5.6127 *
-2.5837 -5.8742 *
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by
institutional investors is in the top 50%. Dumc5hi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of
total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors is in the top 50%, else Dum5hi
equals 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the
period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm
to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term
debt + current debt) / total assets.

Last, if institutional investors mitigate financial constraints allowing firms to continue
investing during the financial crisis, then I expect to see the value of institutional investor
presence increase during the crisis period.
3.

Firms with higher levels of institutional investors have greater performance relative to
low- and no- institutional investor presence during the crisis period.
Using the OLS and Industry Fixed Effects model, I find a positive coefficient on the

crises-institutional investor interaction coefficient indicating the presence of institutional
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investors mitigates market and growth losses that are characteristic of the financial and economic
crisis periods.
Table 13
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
7.8831 73.4918 *
7.9606 74.9633 *
1.6432 10.6733 *
6.0772 *
0.2638

Intercept
Dumhi
Dumii4
PercII
-1.4624 -9.2383
Fincrisis
-2.1508 -11.9222
Econcrisis
3.4669
1.2382
Fincrisis * Dumhi
3.3595
1.4003
Econcrisis * Dumhi
Fincrisis * Dumii4
Econcrisis * Dumii4
Fincrisis * Percii
Econcrisis * Percii
8.7223
10.5780
CapEx
4.2716 276.5938
Leverage
-1.5551 -71.6951
Log (Total Assets)
0.5501
R-Square
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level

*
*
*
*

-1.6619 -9.6888 *
-2.3642 -12.1578 *

0.4680
0.5246

*
*
*

Estimate T-Value
8.0210 75.4257 *

3.0013 12.4679 *
-1.4602 -9.2283 *
-2.1634 -11.9844 *

4.6281 *
4.4648 *

8.5683 *
10.3997
4.2791 277.2449 *
-1.5194 -70.1146 *
0.5497

3.5691 *
1.9600
3.6640 *
2.3594
8.8544 *
10.7353
4.2649 275.8955 *
-1.5858 -72.0833 *
0.5504

Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%. Dumii4
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% and 4
equals the top 25%. Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market
value of the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total
assets.
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Table 14
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
7.8898 74.4410 *
18.9231
4.8916 *

Intercept
Herf
C5
Fincrisis
-1.4052 -9.1657
Econcrisis
-2.0743 -11.8668
Fincrisis * Herf
24.8186
2.8748
Econcrisis * Herf
23.2256
2.3841
Fincrisis * C5
Econcrisis * C5
CapEx
10.1619
8.3731
Leverage
4.2810 277.3392
Log (Total Assets)
-1.4856 -70.6570
R-Square
0.5494
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level

Estimate T-Value
7.9019 74.3093 *
3.1959
6.5264 *
-1.5025 -9.3618 *
-2.2009 -12.0169 *

*
*
*
**

3.9627
3.6074 *
4.4146
3.4577 *
10.4254
8.5878 *
4.2791 277.2138 *
-1.5132 -70.4987 *
0.5496

*
*
*

Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership structure. C5 is the percentage
of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of
market value of the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term
debt + current debt) / total assets.
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Table 15

Dumhi
Dumii4
PercII
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis * Dumhi
Econcrisis * Dumhi
Fincrisis * Dumii4
Econcrisis * Dumii4
Fincrisis * Percii
Econcrisis * Percii
CapEx
Leverage
Log (Total Assets)
R-Square

INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
1.8173 11.7421 *
0.3225
7.3779 *
-1.5164 -9.5814 *
-2.2532 -12.4750 *
1.2723
3.5680 *
1.4663
3.5235 *

-1.7177 -10.0183 *
-2.4665 -12.6694 *

0.4799
0.5436

6.5063
4.9845 *
4.2531 271.8338 *
-1.6383 -69.9122 *
0.5525

Estimate T-Value

3.3261 13.7338 *
-1.5136 -9.5686 *
-2.2678 -12.5497 *

4.7541 *
4.6342 *

6.4693
4.9537 *
4.2609 272.4920 *
-1.6035 -68.4664 *
0.5521

2.0004
3.6488 *
2.4654
3.8354 *
6.5402
5.0124 *
4.2454 271.0874 *
-1.6731 -70.4693 *
0.5529

* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%. Dumii4
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25%
and 4 equals the top 25%. Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls
between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio
of market value of the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt +
current debt) / total assets.
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Table 16
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate
Herf
22.4844
5.7864 *
C5
3.8103
Fincrisis
-1.4498 -9.4575 *
-1.5528
Econcrisis
-2.1623 -12.3540 *
-2.2997
Fincrisis * Herf
24.8124
2.8780 *
Econcrisis * Herf
23.7590
2.4422 **
Fincrisis * C5
4.0097
Econcrisis * C5
4.5750
CapEx
6.5174
4.9884 *
6.5452
Leverage
4.2634 272.6307 *
4.2611
Log (Total Assets)
-1.5618 -68.6291 *
-1.5947
R-Square
0.5517
0.5520

T-Value
7.7337 *
-9.6774 *
-12.5414 *

3.6558
3.5888
5.0112
272.4866
-68.7416

*
*
*
*
*

* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership
structure. C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional
investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if
the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of
the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage =
(long term debt + current debt) / total assets.

After correcting for selection bias using the Heckman model, I confirm a positive
relationship between institutional investor concentration and Q in the pre-crisis period and the
economic crisis period. However, no statistically significant difference was found during the
financial crisis period. That is, institutional investors provide some kind of market value and
growth advantage during periods broad deteriorating economic environment that followed. This
is consistent with institutional investors monitoring firms to ensure they are financing their
operations and investments to maximize firm value.
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Table 17
HECKMAN 2SLS MODEL
1st Stage Dependent
1st Stage Dependent
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
Intercept
-3.4744 -78.5912 *
-1.9345 -89.2155 *
Lag (Dumsp500)
0.3933
9.0977 *
0.2693
6.9897 *
Lag (CapEx)
0.0000 -0.6004
0.0000 -0.7747
Lag (Q)
0.0097
8.4736 *
0.0032
5.1755 *
Lag (Saindex)
-0.7563 -52.4216 *
-0.4240 -55.5036 *
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = Q
Intercept
-0.2425 -0.3810
8.4243 11.2519 *
Dumhi
0.4192
2.1424 **
DumC5hi
-0.5800 -2.4059 **
Fincrisis
-0.4631 -1.2677
-1.0674 -1.9789 **
Econcrisis
-0.4681 -1.5447
-2.5825 -3.8766 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi
0.4954
1.3065
Econcrisis * Dumhi
-0.1201 -0.3696
Fincrisis * DumC5hi
0.8696
1.4955
Econcrisis * DumC5hi
1.4413
2.0306 **
Leverage
0.5494
4.9026 *
4.2360 109.6120 *
Log (Total Assets)
-0.0712 -1.7189 ***
-0.7991 -15.9565 *
CapEx
1.2859
1.0542
8.2043
3.7377 *
Lambda
1.3234
5.5720 *
-2.4896 -5.6396 *
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional
investors is in the top 50%. Dumc5hi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares
outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors is in the top 50%, else Dum5hi equals 0.
Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls
between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of
assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt)
/ total assets.

In summary, I do not find evidence using the investments conduit that institutional
investors provide liquidity to firms. However, I do find evidence that institutional investors
actively monitor investments as a mechanism to maximize firm value. I find that firms generally
decrease capital expenditures during the economic crisis, but firms with higher institutional
investor presence do not decrease their capital expenditures to the magnitude of firms with lowand no- institutional investor presence. This finding is consistent with institutional investors
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providing monitoring services to the firms in which they invest: as the economy slows, firms
with greater institutional investor presence ensure managers continue to fund firm investments at
a rate which maximized firm value. In addition, I find that capital expenditures improve firm
value, and this does not change during the crisis period; as a result, institutional investors have
incentive to monitor that managers do not dramatically decrease their investment expenditures.
Last, I find that institutional investor presence helps mitigate crisis period losses, which is again
consistent with my monitoring hypothesis. If institutional investors encourage the firms in which
they invest to continue investing in assets which improve efficiency and minimize costs, they
better able maintain firm value during crisis periods.
4.2 Research and Development Expenditures
In addition to capital expenditures, I also look at whether institutional investors impact R&D
during the financial crisis. Unlike capital expenditures where the product of the costs is a
tangible good, the product of research and development expenditures is often knowledge or
technology. In addition, much of the cost of R&D is wages to researchers who are exploring and
developing these new ideas which are not immediately profitable. It can take months or years
for a product to come to fruition from the R&D expenditures; improving short term earnings are
not the goal with these investments. In addition, if the research hits a proverbial road block, or
the firm loses a researcher, there is no ability to recover losses. Because of this, R&D
investments are considered to be much riskier. During a recession, increasing R&D will not
immediately benefit a firm, however, it could have long term benefits. Counter-cyclical
literature suggests that firms increase R&D during a “down-cycle” because it allows a firm to
redefine their competitive advantage (Dugal and Morbey, 1995) as well as take advantage of
falling opportunity costs due to decreases in profitability (Franko, 1989; Hall, 1991; Caballero
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and Hammour, 1991). That is, as profitability falls, the opportunity cost of investments—or the
sales or profits that could have been realized if funds were appropriated in the direction of
production instead of investment—also falls making R&D investments relatively cheaper. In
short, firms take extra risks by increasing R&D during the down-cycle in hopes it will bring
them greater long term profitability.
While investing in R&D during a down-cycle has long term benefits, the risk and the
long period to recover costs may cause institutional investors to hesitate increasing these
investment expenditures during periods of uncertainty. Due to the risk associated with R&D
investments as well as the counter-cyclical behavior associated with them, using research and
development to explore if institutional investors provide liquidity to firms during the financial
crisis is a bit murkier. If R&D is generally increasing during the financial crisis due to the
counter-cyclical behavior of firms, then I would expect firms with greater institutional investor
presence, and thus more relaxed financial constraints, to increase their R&D expenditures even
more.
4.

Firms with high levels of institutional investor presence increase (do not decrease) their
R&D more than firms with low- or no- institutional investor presence.
However, if I find that R&D is generally increasing during the financial crisis but firms

with greater institutional investor presence do not increase their R&D to the same extent, then
monitoring by institutional investors is the dominant effect, and the liquidity theory is left
unresolved.
In my OLS and Fixed Effects models, I find a negative relationship between institutional
investors and research and development expenditures. R&D expenditures tend to increase
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during both the financial crisis and economic crisis, but firms with high institutional investor
ownership do not experience the same growth in investment intensity in the economic crisis
period. As a result, the wedge driven between the R&D expenditures of firms with high
institutional investor presence and all other firms becomes larger. These results are weakly
echoed with the institutional investor concentration variables.
Table 18

Intercept
Dumhi
Dumii4
PercII
Q
Liquidity
Salesgrowth
Volatility
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis * Dumhi
Econcrisis * Dumhi
Fincrisis * Dumii4
Econcrisis * Dumii4
Fincrisis * PercII
Econcrisis * PercII
R-Square

Estimate T-Value
0.0146 50.5741 *
-0.0025 -4.4197 *

OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = R&D
Estimate T-Value
0.0144 45.6142 *
-0.0004

0.0002
8.8052 *
-0.0338 -55.8698 *
0.0041 12.3919 *
-0.0003 -5.7878 *
0.0034
5.0683 *
0.0050
6.5884 *
-0.0014 -1.0046
-0.0042 -2.6093 *

0.0823

-2.4489 **

0.0002
8.7914 *
-0.0340 -56.0575 *
0.0041 12.4948 *
-0.0003 -5.7007 *
0.0031
4.2883 *
0.0051
6.0769 *

-0.0001
-0.0009

0.0798

Estimate T-Value
0.0148 51.3981 *

-0.0055 -6.2632 *
0.0002
8.8209 *
-0.0337 -55.7126 *
0.0041 12.2853 *
-0.0003 -5.8768 *
0.0034
5.1061 *
0.0049
6.4081 *

-0.1960
-2.0221 **
-0.0023
-0.0055
0.0806

-1.0706
-2.2616 **

*denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%. Dumii4
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investos where 1 equals the bottom 25% and 4
equals the top 25%. Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net income +
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = standard deviation of the changes in
quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from
previous quarter.
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Table 19
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = R&D
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
Intercept
0.0143 51.4113 *
0.0144 49.0994
Herf
-0.0441 -2.9356 *
C5
-0.0060 -3.2153
Q
0.0002
8.7715 *
0.0002
8.7677
Liquidity
-0.0340 -56.2097 *
-0.0339 -56.0553
Salesgrowth
0.0041 12.5373 *
0.0041 12.4690
Volatility
-0.0003 -5.6391 *
-0.0003 -5.7086
Fincrisis
0.0030
4.7280 *
0.0031
4.5866
Econcrisis
0.0043
5.8477 *
0.0047
6.1014
Fincrisis * Herf
0.0057
0.1713
Econcrisis * Herf
-0.0200 -0.5502
Fincrisis * C5
-0.0005 -0.1185
Econcrisis * C5
-0.0080 -1.6283
R-Square
0.0798
0.0799

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

*denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership
structure. C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional
investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if
the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net income +
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets,
Volatility = standard deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income
before extraordinary items divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from previous
quarter.
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Table 20

Dumhi
Dumii4
PercII
Q
Liquidity
Salesgrowth
Volatility
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis * Dumhi
Econcrisis * Dumhi
Fincrisis * Dumii4
Econcrisis * Dumii4
Fincrisis * PercII
Econcrisis * PercII
R-Square

INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = R&D
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
-0.0022 -3.9480 *
-0.0004 -2.4745 **
0.0001
7.5626 *
-0.0295 -51.0236 *
0.0030
9.5773 *
-0.0002 -3.8214 *
0.0037
5.7411 *
0.0058
7.9253 *
-0.0007 -0.5694
-0.0040 -2.6372 *

0.0001
7.5440 *
-0.0296 -51.1541 *
0.0030
9.6466 *
-0.0002 -3.7635 *
0.0034
4.9251 *
0.0059
7.4366 *

0.0000
-0.0010

0.1708

0.1705

Estimate

T-Value

-0.0044 -5.1893 *
0.0001
7.5851 *
-0.0294 -50.9121 *
0.0030
9.5090 *
-0.0002 -3.8872 *
0.0037
5.8146 *
0.0057
7.8878 *

0.0972
-2.2714 **
-0.0014
-0.0060
0.1710

-0.6942
-2.5697 **

*denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%. Dumii4
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investos where 1 equals the bottom 25% and 4
equals the top 25%. Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net income +
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = standard deviation of the changes in
quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from
previous quarter.
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Table 21
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = R&D
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
Herf
-0.0341 -2.3721 **
C5
-0.0054 -3.0520
Q
0.0001
7.5302 *
0.0001
7.5243
Liquidity
-0.0297 -51.3377 *
-0.0296 -51.1670
Salesgrowth
0.0031
9.7029 *
0.0030
9.6327
Volatility
-0.0002 -3.6790 *
-0.0002 -3.7609
Fincrisis
0.0033
5.4521 *
0.0034
5.2633
Econcrisis
0.0051
7.3153 *
0.0056
7.5338
Fincrisis * Herf
0.0193
0.6126
Econcrisis * Herf
-0.0277 -0.7981
Fincrisis * C5
0.0011
0.2661
Econcrisis * C5
-0.0088 -1.8883
R-Square
0.1704
0.1706

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

***

*denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership structure. C5 is the
percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls
between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis
= 0. Liquidity = (Net income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of
assets, Volatility = standard deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before
extraordinary items divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from previous quarter.

However, the most appropriate model to view is the Heckman model which controls for
selection bias. Unlike the capital expenditures models where very weak selection bias was
found, there is strong presence of self-selection in the R&D model.
After correcting for selection bias using the Heckman model, it appears that the negative
relationship between institutional investors and R&D investments that was reported in the OLS
and Fixed effects models stems from a self-selection issue. Using the Heckman model, I find a
positive relationship between institutional investor concentration and R&D expenditures in the
first stage indicating that the likelihood of institutional investor concentration increases with
greater R&D expenditures. In the second stage equations, I find that R&D increases during the
financial crisis, but firms with high institutional investor presence do not increase their R&D
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expenditures to the same magnitude. This is consistent with the OLS and Industry Fixed Effects
models reported earlier.
Table 22
HECKMAN 2SLS MODEL
1st Stage Dependent
1st Stage Dependent
Variable = Lag
Variable = Lag (DumHi)
(DumC5Hi)
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
Intercept
-3.5810 -77.8639 *
-2.0802 -89.0613 *
Lag (DumSP500)
0.4288
9.9715 *
0.3135
8.1047 *
Lag (R&D)
0.0002
0.4338
0.0000
0.3662
Lag (Q)
0.0091
6.8175 *
0.0021
2.6818 *
Lag (Saindex)
-0.7768 -52.1999 *
-0.4474 -55.1321 *
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = R&D
Intercept
-0.0389 -10.2271 *
-0.0549 -16.9377 *
Dumhi
0.0053
2.0588 **
DumC5Hi
0.0048
3.0650 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi
-0.0156 -3.2420 *
Econcrisis * Dumhi
-0.0010 -0.2235
Fincrisis * DumC5hi
-0.0052 -1.3082
Econcrisis * DumC5hi
0.0044
0.9179
Fincrisis
0.0162
3.4909 *
0.0083
2.2005 **
Econcrisis
0.0022
0.5606
-0.0011 -0.2368
Q
0.0058 15.4748 *
0.0003
2.9638 *
Liquidity
-0.1018 -19.1149 *
-0.0578 -24.9836 *
Salesgrowth
0.0042
3.7197 *
0.0076
8.6624 *
Volatility
0.0010
1.0759
-0.0009 -1.8589 ***
Lambda
0.0207 13.1261 *
0.0470 22.2835 *
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional
investors is in the top 50%, otherwise Dumhi equals 0. Dumc5hi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the
percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 institutional investors is in the top 50%, otherwise
Dumc5hi equals 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1
if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net income + depreciation) /
total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = standard
deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items
divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from previous quarter. Sa-Index is a proxy for
financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). DumSP500 is a dummy variable which
equals 1 if the firm is included in the S&P500 for that quarter, otherwise it equals 0. The first stage variables
are lagged by 1 year.

My results suggest that investments are a conduit through which institutional investors
control firm value. However, I do not find evidence that institutional investors alleviate financial
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constraints allowing the firms in which they invest to maintain or increase investments during
periods of economic crisis. While the practice by institutional investor firms to not significantly
increase investments in the manner of other firms exhibits investment smoothing behavior, it is
not in the pattern consistent with improved liquidity. If this was a liquidity problem, then I
would see institutional investor firms increasing (or not decreasing) their investments while all
other firms were forced to decrease investment expenditures. Instead, it appears that institutional
investors monitor the investment intensity of firms to maximize short term value during crises.
Institutional investors likely monitor R&D investments during crisis periods for two
reasons: 1) the presence of institutional investors ensures managers are consistently investing
efficiently and thus any increase in investments when opportunity costs fall would result in
overinvestment (investment beyond the efficient level) and thus a decrease in value. 2)
institutional investors encourage managers to mitigate short-term losses in firm value by not
increasing R&D expenditures. Increasing R&D during the financial crisis may increase long-run
performance, but it will likely not increase firm value in the short period. In fact, increasing
R&D during a crisis period may result in a decrease in short-term value since it directly
negatively affects earnings and increases risk. Either way, both explanations indicate
institutional investors monitor R&D investments, and I expect to find that if firms increase their
R&D investments during the financial crisis, they will have worse crisis period firm value than
the institutional investor firms which do not increase their R&D investments to the same extent.
Otherwise, institutional investors would not encourage firms to maintain (not increase) their
R&D investments.
5.

Firms which increase their R&D investment expenditures during the financial crisis have
lower performance for the crisis period.
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The OLS and industry fixed effects models show that, while R&D is generally positively
related to Q value, firms which have high R&D expenditures during the economic crisis
experience worse declines in Q relative to their peers.
Table 23
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
7.6721 72.2686 *
7.5571 71.1046 *
1.8235 13.6506 *
0.3468
9.1949 *

Intercept
Dumhi
Dumii4
PercII
R&D
12.9978 14.2246
Leverage
4.2849 282.8127
Log (Total Assets) -1.4990 -69.9704
Fincrisis
-0.8761 -5.9881
Econcrisis
-1.4187 -8.4927
Fincrisis * R&D
-16.9569 -8.6387
Econcrisis * R&D -23.8379 -12.0170
R-Square
0.5520

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

13.0149 14.2337 *
4.2915 283.3833 *
-1.4670 -68.3765 *
-0.8737 -5.9685 *
-1.4168 -8.4760 *
-16.9870 -8.6497 *
-23.8948 -12.0398 *
0.5516

Estimate T-Value
7.7247 72.6855 *

3.3249 15.8601 *
12.9895 14.2206 *
4.2787 282.1526 *
-1.5281 -70.3889 *
-0.8663 -5.9229 *
-1.4048 -8.4118 *
-17.0156 -8.6712 *
-23.9073 -12.0557 *
0.5523

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%. Dumii4
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25%
and 4 equals the top 25%. Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls
between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio
of market value of the firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current
debt) / total assets.
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Table 24
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate
Intercept
7.6206 71.7987 *
7.6109
Herf
25.1612
7.7428 *
C5
3.9735
R&D
13.1515 14.3858 *
13.0796
Leverage
4.2929 283.4941 *
4.2913
Log (Total Assets) -1.4396 -69.1615 *
-1.4625
Fincrisis
-0.8955 -6.1173 *
-0.8887
Econcrisis
-1.4498 -8.6749 *
-1.4379
Fincrisis * R&D
-16.9732 -8.6416 *
-16.9888
Econcrisis * R&D -23.9229 -12.0525 *
-23.9185
R-Square
0.5515
0.5516

T-Value
71.7232 *
9.5020
14.3077
283.3724
-68.9222
-6.0715
-8.6044
-8.6508
-12.0521

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership structure.
C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if
the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, R&D=
Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total assets.
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Table 25
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
2.0885 15.5091 *
0.4335 11.3755 *

Dumhi
Dumii4
PercII
R&D
15.1570 15.8947
Leverage
4.2641 277.6490
Log (Total Assets) -1.5893 -69.0744
Fincrisis
-0.9438 -6.4526
Econcrisis
-1.5191 -9.0934
Fincrisis * R&D
-17.2555 -8.8112
Econcrisis * R&D -24.0703 -12.1615
R-Square
0.5547

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

15.1131 15.8400 *
4.2712 278.2265 *
-1.5589 -67.6706 *
-0.9372 -6.4038 *
-1.5110 -9.0396 *
-17.3028 -8.8305 *
-24.1321 -12.1863 *
0.5543

Estimate T-Value

3.7981 17.9530 *
15.1884 15.9339 *
4.2569 276.9370 *
-1.6230 -69.6753 *
-0.9349 -6.3942 *
-1.5062 -9.0195 *
-17.3265 -8.8508 *
-24.1526 -12.2078 *
0.5551

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%.
Dumii4 classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the
bottom 25% and 4 equals the top 25%. Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if
the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis =
0. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage =
(long term debt + current debt) / total assets.

Table 26
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate
Herf
30.5199
9.3295 *
C5
4.8896
R&D
15.1723 15.8991 *
15.1724
Leverage
4.2735 278.4009 *
4.2712
Log (Total Assets)
-1.5220 -67.9682 *
-1.5515
Fincrisis
-0.9618 -6.5704 *
-0.9565
Econcrisis
-1.5488 -9.2649 *
-1.5381
Fincrisis * R&D
-17.2711 -8.8126 *
-17.2950
Econcrisis * R&D -24.1500 -12.1929 *
-24.1548
R-Square
0.5541
0.5543

T-Value
11.5796
15.9028
278.2515
-68.0640
-6.5363
-9.2028
-8.8268
-12.1980

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership structure. C5 is the percentage
of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of
market value of the firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt
+ current debt) / total assets.
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When using Heckman 2SLS to explore how investments affect Q-value, I confirm my OLS and
Industry Fixed Effects Results. I find that an increase in R&D investments during both crisis
periods results in a further decline in Q. Bringing all my R&D results together, I find that firms
generally tend to increase R&D during the financial crisis, but firms with greater institutional
investor presence decrease R&D. Institutional investors prefer their firms to not increase R&D
during crisis periods because R&D decreases value during this period.
Table 27

Intercept
Lag(Dumsp500)
Lag(adjcapxyq)
Lag(Q)
Lag(Saindex)
Intercept
Dumhi
DumC5hi
R&D
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis * R&D
Econcrisis * R&D
Leverage
Log(Total Assets)
Lambda

HECKMAN 2SLS MODEL
1st Stage Dependent
1st Stage Dependent
Variable = Lag
Variable = Lag (DumHi)
(DumC5Hi)
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
-3.4484 -79.3264 *
-1.9246 -90.4742 *
0.4158
9.6564 *
0.2781
7.2574 *
0.0002
0.4127
0.0000
0.3001
0.0096
8.5713 *
0.0031
5.0719 *
-0.7419 -52.3004 *
-0.4188 -55.9540 *
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = Q
0.9597
1.4882
9.7246 12.8312 *
0.4497
2.9800 *
-0.4212 -2.0186 **
9.2065
6.9054 *
14.0080
8.1166 *
0.0179
0.1704
0.0146
0.0677
-0.5538 -4.6642 *
-0.9621 -3.9434 *
-4.4807 -1.9733 **
-17.0063 -5.2845 *
-2.5583 -0.9407
-21.4691 -6.4078 *
0.4550
3.8695 *
4.2036 107.7976 *
-0.1210 -2.8515 *
-0.8398 -16.9160 *
0.6983
2.8262 *
-3.4869 -7.7685 *

* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by
institutional investors is in the top 50%, else Dumhi equals 0. Dumc5hi is a dummy variable which equals
1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors is in the top
50%, else Dum5hi equals 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0.
Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of
market value of the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and
Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total assets.
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Last, if institutional investors monitor R&D investments during the crisis period and
encourage firms to maintain (not increase) their expenditures to mitigate crisis period losses, then
I expect to see the value of institutional investor presence increase during the crisis period.
6.

Firms with higher levels of institutional investors have better performance relative to
low- and no- institutional investor presence during the crisis period.
Using OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, I find that as Q declines in the financial and

economic crisis periods, firms with high institutional investor presence or concentration perform
better than their peers. Firms which had greater institutional investor presence or concentration
enjoy mitigated crisis period losses. After correcting for selection bias, I confirm that
institutional investor concentration (but not presence in general) alleviates crisis period losses.
This is consistent with monitoring theory because they greater an investors’ position in the firm,
the more incentive the investor has to monitor.
In summary, my results indicate that R&D investments are a conduit through which
institutional investors control firm value. However, I do not find evidence that institutional
investors alleviate financial constraints allowing the firms in which they invest to maintain or
increase R&D expenditures during periods of financial crisis. Instead, it appears that
institutional investors monitor the R&D investment intensity of firms to maximize short term
value during crises. That is, when the economy is constricted, institutional investors encourage
their firms to maintain (not increase) R&D expenditures which helps to reduce crisis period
performance losses.
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Table 28

Intercept
Dumhi
Dumii4
PercII
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis * Dumhi
Econcrisis * Dumhi
Fincrisis * Dumii4
Econcrisis * Dumii4
Fincrisis * Percii
Econcrisis * Percii
R&D
Leverage
Log (Total Assets)
R-Square

OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
7.8934 74.3512 *
7.8337 73.1612 *
1.4833
9.7265 *
0.2174
5.0561 *
-1.4790 -9.5156 *
-2.2616 -12.7925 *
1.2385
3.4855 *
1.4739
3.5589 *

-1.6874 -10.0065 *
-2.4815 -13.0047 *

0.4756
0.5452

6.0380
8.0811 *
4.2792 282.4672 *
-1.5021 -70.0631 *
0.5514

Estimate T-Value
7.9513 74.7724 *

2.7652 11.5813 *
-1.4771 -9.5027 *
-2.2703 -12.8296 *

4.7358 *
4.6770 *

6.0312
8.0659 *
4.2858 283.0539 *
-1.4693 -68.4408 *
0.5510

1.9567
3.5746 *
2.4423
3.8072 *
6.0012
8.0348 *
4.2730 281.8077 *
-1.5311 -70.4794 *
0.5516

* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%. Dumii4
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% and 4
equals the top 25%. Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market
value of the firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total
assets.
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Table 29
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate
Intercept
7.8199 73.8012 *
7.8394
Herf
18.3828
4.7937 *
C5
2.8036
Fincrisis
-1.4073 -9.3407 *
-1.5131
Econcrisis
-2.1668 -12.6434 *
-2.3045
Fincrisis * Herf
22.3870
2.6091 *
Econcrisis * Herf 22.2821
2.3195 **
Fincrisis * C5
3.8836
Econcrisis * C5
4.5312
R&D
6.1457
8.2211 *
6.0838
Leverage
4.2870 283.1151 *
4.2857
Log (Total Assets)
-1.4425 -69.2300 *
-1.4644
R-Square
0.5508
0.5509

T-Value
73.7668 *
5.7797 *
-9.6002 *
-12.8417 *

3.5555
3.5800
8.1385
283.0239
-68.9469

*
*
*
*
*

* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership
structure. C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional
investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if
the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of
the firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage =
(long term debt + current debt) / total assets.
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Table 30

Dumhi
Dumii4
PercII
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis * Dumhi
Econcrisis * Dumhi
Fincrisis * Dumii4
Econcrisis * Dumii4
Fincrisis * Percii
Econcrisis * Percii
R&D
Leverage
Log (Total Assets)
R-Square

INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
1.7363 11.3218 *
0.2997
6.9219 *
-1.5598 -10.0398 *
-2.3833 -13.4758 *
1.2623
3.5593 *
1.5469
3.7426 *

-1.7704 -10.5052 *
-2.6064 -13.6540 *

0.4864
0.5698

8.0682 10.1517 *
4.2592 277.3193 *
-1.5899 -69.0347 *
0.5540

Estimate T-Value

3.2184 13.3921 *
-1.5585 -10.0317 *
-2.3956 -13.5339 *

4.8534 *
4.8973 *

8.0032 10.0650 *
4.2663 277.9233 *
-1.5585 -67.5955 *
0.5536

1.9883
3.6398 *
2.5736
4.0206 *
8.0713 10.1596 *
4.2519 276.6109 *
-1.6235 -69.6314 *
0.5544

* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%. Dumii4
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% and 4
equals the top 25%. Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market
value of the firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total
assets.
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Table 31

Herf
C5
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis * Herf
Econcrisis * Herf
Fincrisis * C5
Econcrisis * C5
R&D
Leverage
Log (Total Assets)
R-Square

INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Estimate T-Value
Estimate
23.7098
6.1542 *
3.6937
-1.4795 -9.8222 *
-1.5904
-2.2767 -13.2775 *
-2.4251
22.0650
2.5758 *
22.8649
2.3843 **
3.8955
4.7245
8.0377 10.1056 *
8.0467
4.2682 278.0286 *
4.2664
-1.5226 -67.9103 *
-1.5509
0.5533
0.5536

T-Value
7.5637 *
-10.0945 *
-13.5073 *

3.5729
3.7399
10.1197
277.9167
-67.9549

*
*
*
*
*

* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership
structure. C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional
investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if
the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of the
firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long
term debt + current debt) / total assets.
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Table 32
HECKMAN 2SLS MODEL
1st Stage Dependent
1st Stage Dependent
Estimate T-Value
Estimate T-Value
Intercept
-3.4484 -79.3264 *
-1.9246 -90.4742 *
Lag (Dumsp500)
0.4158
9.6564 *
0.2781
7.2574 *
Lag (R&D)
0.0002
0.4127
0.0000
0.3001
Lag (Q)
0.0096
8.5713 *
0.0031
5.0719 *
Lag (Saindex)
-0.7419 -52.3004 *
-0.4188 -55.9540 *
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = Q
Intercept
0.9802
1.4869
9.9062 13.0464 *
Dumhi
0.4074
2.0152 **
DumC5hi
-0.6556 -2.7592 *
Fincrisis
-0.5570 -1.4847
-0.7044 -1.2857
Econcrisis
-0.4078 -1.2966
-2.7815 -4.3059 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi
0.5615
1.4409
Econcrisis * Dumhi
-0.2162 -0.6409
Fincrisis * DumC5hi
0.4654
0.7875
Econcrisis * DumC5hi
1.5772
2.2760 **
Leverage
0.4450
3.8024 *
4.2076 107.7683 *
Log (Total Assets)
-0.1184 -2.7909 *
-0.8348 -16.7401 *
R&D
7.6687
7.4685 *
6.1129
4.5088 *
Lambda
0.7139
2.8924 *
-3.3979 -7.5289 *
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional
investors is in the top 50%. Dumc5hi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares
outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors is in the top 50%, else Dum5hi equals 0.
Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls
between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of
assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) /
total assets.

4.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I use investments to explore how institutional investors affect liquidity during the
Global Financial Crisis while also investigating how institutional investors monitor investments
to maximize firm value. My results are most consistent with Monitoring Hypothesis during the
economic crisis period where institutional investor presence promotes efficient levels of
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investments allowing institutional investor firms to maintain (not increase or decrease) their precrisis investment levels. Because of their monitoring efforts, the presence of institutional
investors becomes more valuable during crisis periods. This study further clarifies the role
institutional investors play in corporate governance.

59

References
Agca, S. and Mozumdar, A., 2008. The impact of capital market imperfections on
investment-cash flow sensitivity. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32, 207-216.
Aghion, P., Van Reenen, J., and Zingales, L., 2009. Innovation and Institutional
Ownership. NBER Working Paper Series 14769.
Agrawal, A. and Mandelker, G., 1990. Large shareholders and the monitoring of
managers: the case of antitakeover charter amendments. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 25 (2), 143-161.
Aggarwal, R., Erel, I., Ferreira, M. and Matos, P., 2011. Does Governance Travel Around
the World? Evidence from Institutional Investors. Journal of Financial Ecoomics, 100
(1), 154-181.
Allayannis, G. and Mozumdar, A., 2004. The impact of negative cash flow and
influential observations on investment-cash flow sensitivity estimates. Journal of
Banking and Finance, 28, 901-930.
Almeida, H., Campello, M., and Weisbach, M., 2004. The cash flow sensitivity of cash. The
Journal of Finance, 59 (4).
Alvarez, R. and Jara-Bertin, M., and Pombo, C., 2016. Do Institutional Investors
Unbind Firm Financial Constraints? Evidence from Emerging Markets. Documento
CEDE No. 2016-30. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2844345.
Arvantis, S. and Woerter, M., 2013. Firm characteristics and the cyclicality of R&D
investments. Industrial and Corporate Change, 23 (5), 1141-1169.
Baker, M., Stein, J., and Wurgler, J., 2003. When does the market matter? Stock prices and the
investments of equity-dependent firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Barlevy, G., 2007. On the cyclicality of research and development. The American Economic
Review, 97 (4), 1131-1164.
Basinger, B., Kosnik, R., and Turk, T., 1991. Effects of board and ownership structure on
corporate R&D strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 34 (1), 205-214.
Beneito, P., Rochina-Barracina, M.E., Sanchis-Llopis, A., 2015. Ownership and the cyclicality of
firms’ R&D investment. International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal,
11(2), 343-249.
60

Berger, A. and Udell, G., 1998. The economics of small business finance: The roles of private
equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22
(6), 613-673.
Billio, M., Getmansky, M., Lo, A., and Pelizzon, L., 2012. Econometric measures of
connectedness and systemic risk in the finance and insurance sectors. Journal of
Financial Economics, 104 (3), 535-559.
Black, B., 1992. Institutional investors and corporate governance: the case for institutional
voice. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 5 (3).
Blanchard, O., Rhee, C., and Summers, L., 1993. The stock market, profit and investment.
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Boone, A. and White, J.T., 2015. The eﬀ ect of institutional ownership on ﬁrm
transparency and information production. Journal of Financial Economics, 117 (3), 508533.
Boulding, W. and Staelin, R., 1995. Identifying the generalizable effects of strategic
actions on firm performance: the case of demand-side returns to R&D spending.
Marketing Science.
Brickley, J., Lease, R. and Smith, C., 1988. Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover
amendments. Journal of Financial Economics, 20 (1), 267-291.
Bushee, B., 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment
behavior. The Accounting Review, 73 (3), 305-333.
Bushee, B., 2001. Do institutional investors prefer near-term earnings over long-run value?
Contemporary Accounting Research, 18 (2), 207-246.
Caballero, R. and Hammour, M., 1991. The cleansing effect of recessions. NBER
Working Paper No. 3922. Available at NBER: http://www.nber.org/papers/w3922.
Chemmanur, T., He, S., and Hu, G., 2009. The role of institutional investors in seasoned equity
offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(3), 384-411.
Cho, M.H., 1998. Ownership structure, investments, and the corporate value: an
empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 47, 103-121.
Chung, K., Wright, P., and Charoenwong, C., 1998. Investment opportunities and market
reaction to capital expenditure decisions. Journal of Banking and Finance, 22 (1), 41-60.
61

Cleary, S., Povel, P., and Raith, M., 2007. The U-shaped investment curve: theory and evidence.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 42 (1), 1-40.
Dangl, T. and Wu, Y., 2013. Corporate investment over the business cycle. Review
of Finance, 20 (1), 337-371.
Demsetz, H., 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law
and Economics, 26.
Demiralp, I., D’Mello, R., Schlingemann, F., and Subramaniam, V., 2011. Are there monitoring
benefits to institutional ownership? Evidence from seasoned equity offerings. Journal of
Corporate Finance, 17 (5), 1340-1359.
Denis, D. and Mihov, V., 2003. The choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public
debt: evidence from new corporate borrowings. Journal of Financial Economics, 70 (1),
3-28.
Dugal, S. and Morbey, G., 1995. Revisiting corporate R&D spending during a
recession. Research-Technology Management, 38 (4), 23-27.
Fahlenbrach, R., 2004. Founder-CEOs and stock market performance. Fisher College of
Business, Ohio State University.
Fama, E. and French, K., 1992. The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of Finance,
47, 2, 427-465.
Fatas, A., 2000. Do business cycles case long shadows? Short-run persistence and economic
growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 147-162.
Fazzari, S. and Peterson, B., 1988. Finance constraints and corporate investment. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 141-206.
Franko, L., 1989. Global corporate competition: who’s winning, who’s losing, and the R&D
factor as one reason why. Strategic Management Journal, 10 (5), 449-474.
Geroski, P.A. and Walters, C.F., 1995. Innovative activity over the business cycle. The Economic
Journal, 105, 916-928.
Gugler, K., Mueller, D., Yurtoglu, B., 2004. Marginal q, Tobin’s q, cash flow, and investment.
Southern Economic Journal, 70 (3), 512-531.
Hadlock, C. and Pierce, J., 2010. New evidence on measuring financial constraints: Moving
62

beyond the KZ index. Review of Financial Studies, 23(5), 1909-1940.
Hall, R., 1991. Recessions as reorganizations. NBER macroeconomics annual, 17-47.
Hall, B., 1992. Investment and research and development at the firm level: does the source of
financing matter? NBER working paper No. w4096. National bureau of economic
research.
Hall, B., 2002. The financing of research and development. Oxford review of economic
policy, 18(1), 35-51.
Hall, B. and Lerner, J., 2010. The financing of R&D and innovation. Handbook of the
Economics of Innovation, 1, 609-639.
Hanley, K and Wilhelm, W., 1995. Evidence on the strategic allocation of initial public
offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 37(2), 239-257.
Hartzell, J. and Starks, L., 2003. Institutional investors and executive compensation. The
Journal of Finance, 58(6), 2351-2374.
Hill, C. and Snell, S., 1988. External control, corporate strategy, and firm performance in
research‐ intensive industries. Strategic Management Journal, 9(6), 577-590.
Himmelberg, C. and Petersen, B., 1994. R & D and internal finance: A panel study of small
firms in high-tech industries. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 38-51.
Ismail, M. and Krishnaswami, S., 2017. Essays on the Impact of Institutional Investors on
Firms’ Liquidity and Payout Policy. Working Paper.
Jaffee, A., 1986. Technological opportunity and spillovers of R&D: evidence from firms’
patents, profits, and market value. The American Economic Review, 76 (5), 984-1001.
Jarrell, G. and Lehn, K., 1985. Institutional ownership, tender offers and long-term investment.
Securities Exchange Commission.
Karpavicius, S. and Yu, F., 2014. How Institutional Monitoring Creates Value: Evidence
for the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis. Working Paper. Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1910976
Knudsen, E.S. and Lien, L.B., 2014. Investments in recessions. Finance and Strategy, 3-36.
Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Krishnaswami, S., Spindt, P., and Subramaniam, V., 1999. Information asymmetry, monitoring,
63

and the placement structure of corporate debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 51, 407434.
Kuppuswamy, Venkat and Villalonga, Belen, 2010. Does Diversification Create Value in the
Presence of External Financing Constraints? Evidence from the 2007–2009 Financial
Crisis. Harvard Business School Finance Working Paper No. 10-101. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1571255
López-García, P., Montero, J.M. and Moral-Benito, E., 2013. Business cycles and investment in
productivity-enhancing activities: Evidence from Spanish Firms. Industry and
Innovation, 20(7), 611-636.
Maury, B., 2010. Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from
western European corporations. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12 (2), 321-341.
McConnell, J. and Muscarella, C, 1985. Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the
market value of the firm. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(3), 399-422.
McConnell, J. and Servaes, H., 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate
value. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 595-612.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., Shapiro, M. and Poterba, J., 1990. The stock market
and investment: is the market a sideshow?. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
1990(2), 157-215.
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M.H.., 1958. The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of
investment. The American Economic Review, 261-297.
Pound, J., 1988. Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial
Economics, 20, 237-265.
Schain, J.P. and Stiebale, J., 2016. Innovation, Institutional Ownership, and Financial
Constraints. DICE Discussion Paper 219. Available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130194
Shleifer, A, and Vishny, R., 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. The Journal of
Political Economy, 94 (3), 461-488.
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance,
52(2), 737-783.

64

Smith, M., 1996. Shareholder activism by institutional investors: evidence from CalPERS. The
Journal of Finance, 51 (1), 227-252.
Strickland, D., Wiles, K., and Zenner, M., 1996. A requiem for the USA is small shareholder
monitoring effective? Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 319-338.
Wahal, S., 1996. Pension fund activism and firm performance. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 31 (1).

65

Appendix A
Calculation of Control Variables
Liquidity = (Net income + depreciation) / total assets
Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total assets
Firm Size = natural log (total assets)
Volatility = standard deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals
income before extraordinary items divided by assets
Salesgrowth = (salest – salest-1) / salest-1

Note: These control variables are derived from a number of sources including Fahlenbrach
(2004), Maury (2006), Demiralp et al. (2011), and Cho (1998).
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Chapter 2
“The role of dedicated investors during the financial crisis.”

1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 1, I explore how institutional investors influence investments. I find that institutional
investors monitor firm investments to maximize value during crisis periods. I do not find
evidence that institutional investor presence nor concentration affects liquidity through the
investments mechanism. In this chapter, I revisit the liquidity hypothesis by exploring it from a
different angle. The institutional investor variable in Chapter 1 analyzes the impact of aggregate
shares held by institutional investors on investments; it does not consider that different types of
institutional investors may be more likely to mitigate financial constraints or actively monitor to
try to influence management. It has been argued that institutional investors have better
information and better resources (Pound, 1988) and thus are better able to perceive value of
impending projects and provide capital when debt and cash flows dry up (Hanley and Wilhelm,
1995; Chemmanur et al., 2009; Krishnaswami et al.,1999). However, not all institutional
investors are created equal. It is generally accepted that long-term institutional investors are
more likely to spend resources accumulating knowledge about the firms in which they invest
giving them a better advantage to facilitate capital and actively monitor. Short-term, momentum
institutional investors are not incentivized to collect information, and they are more likely to sell
upon information than try to incite any change. As a result, breaking down my aggregate
institutional investor variable from my first essay into types of institutional investors may yield
improved results.
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In this chapter, I explore how dedicated, long term investors impact investments and
performance during the financial crisis. Institutional investors can affect investments by
providing both liquidity and monitoring services to their firms. Thus, I test whether long term
investors ease financial constraints during the financial crisis allowing firms to maintain their
investments, as well as if long term investors are more likely to use investments as a mechanism
to maximize firm value. If institutional investors reduce financial constraints, then I would
expect to see a firms with greater institutional investor presence do not decline capital
investments as much as their peers during the credit crunch. Because R&D is counter-cyclical in
behavior, I expect to see that that firms with greater institutional investor presence are able to
increase their R&D expenditures by a greater amount during the credit crisis than their more
financially constrained peers. If this is the case, then I can conclude that investments are one
channel through which increased liquidity manifests. If long-term institutional investors provide
greater monitoring services, then I assume that firms with greater dedicated investor presence
will be operating at efficient levels of investments in the pre-crisis period, and thus any change in
investment would result in inefficiencies and reduced firm value. Thus, I expect to find that if
monitoring is strong, firms with greater dedicated investor presence will maintain valuemaximizing investment levels during the crisis periods while their peers have significant changes
in investment behavior which result in decreases in firm value. This would result in dedicated
investors becoming more valuable during crisis periods.
Using financial and economic crisis dummy variables, I find weak evidence that dedicated
investors monitor investments which improves firm value. This topic is of importance because it
follows recent literature exploring how ownership structure affects business activities, which can
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in turn have long-lasting effects on firm performance.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Past literature suggests that institutional investors can support firms in achieving efficient
investment levels. One way institutional investors can encourage efficient firm-level investing is
by facilitating capital. When internal funds and credit dry up, it is hard for firms to maintain their
optimal investment levels. Institutional investors can step in to fill this void. In Chapter 1, I do
not find evidence through the investments mechanism that institutional investors provide
liquidity to the firms in which they invest. However, diverse types of institutional investors are
incentivized to take different actions (Lang and McNichols, 1997). For example, Ismail and
Krishnaswami (2017 working paper) find that institutional investors alleviate financial
constraints, and this effect is predominantly driven by long-term (dedicated) investors. In this
paper, I explore whether a specific institutional investor type is better at providing firms with
liquidity than its peers. This paper is a direct fallout from Chapter 1 and is motivated by the
behavior of different investors. Bushee (1998) shows that long-term investors are more
incentivized to gather information and monitor firms while short-term traders tend to be
momentum traders with little incentive to monitor. If a long-term investor is more
knowledgeable about a project and deems it valuable, I expect they will be more willing to
provide capital to the firm when other financing avenues are constrained.
Another way institutional investors can influence efficient investment behavior is by
decreasing information asymmetries and actively encouraging action through the value-adding
monitoring services they provide (Pound, 1988; Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 and
1997; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Black, 1992; Smith, 1996; Strickland, Wiles, and Zennery,
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1996; Wahal, 1996). Chapter 1 results indicate that during recessions, the value-added benefit
of institutional investor presence becomes even greater. I find that during recessions, the
difference between the value of Q for high institutionally owned firms and low/no institutionally
owned firms increases, and one mechanism through which institutional investors improve firm
value is investments. During crisis periods, capital expenditures continue to add value at the
same pre-crisis rate while R&D investments deteriorate performance. Thus, institutional
investors encourage their firms to maintain its efficient, pre-crisis investments levels; that is, they
encourage firms to uphold capital expenditures levels and not to increase R&D expenditures. As
a result, the presence of institutional investors becomes more valuable. In this paper, I explore if
the results found in Chapter 1 are driven by a certain type of investor. Bushee (1998) classifies
traders based on three types: dedicated, transient and quasi-indexers. He reports that long-term
institutional investors with information and the ability to monitor managers incentivizes
managers to choose R&D levels which maximize long-run value rather than short-term goals.
However, as the presence of short-term, transient institutional investors increases, the likelihood
that managers decrease R&D to cover a decline in earnings increases. Chen, Harford and Li
(2007) confirm these results when they investigate how different types of institutional investors
influence decisions. They find that firms benefit from having independent, long-term institutions
in their ownership structure as they provide value-added monitoring services. Almazan, Hartzell
and Starks (2000) find that institutional investors reduce executive compensation. Almazan,
Hartzell and Starks (2005) conclude that certain types of institutional investors, namely those
which have low monitoring costs like independent investment advisors and investment company
managers, provide monitoring benefits. As you can see, different types of investors are
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incentivized to collect information which results in varying levels of liquidity and monitoring
services provided across investor classifications.

3. METHODOLOGY AND DATASET
3.1 Estimation Procedure
I borrow my methodology from my first essay. I use OLS, Industry Fixed Effects and Heckman
2SLS with instrumental variables to investigate how institutional investor types affect
investments and firm value during crisis periods. Using these various regression models allows
me to correct for omitted variable bias and self-selection bias associated with my variables of
interest.

3.2 Variables
I explore the relationship between institutional investor types, investment behavior and firm
value during crisis periods. I measure performance, investments, and crisis periods similar to my
first essay. I measure performance as the value of Tobin’s Q. Q measures growth opportunities
and is calculated as the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets. I measure
investment by looking at two very different types of investments: capital expenditures and
research and development expenditures. Capital expenditures are quarterly expenditures on
physical assets that enhance efficiency and current processes thereby lowering costs and
increasing profits. Though expensive, this type of investment has little risk as the physical asset
can be sold to recoup losses. R&D expenditures are quarterly expenditures on activities that help
acquire knowledge and develop technologies. These investments help create new competitive
advantages and promote long term growth, but they can take years to implement. Furthermore,
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because the product of R&D is not a tangible good, it is hard to recover any losses in the event of
failure. These characteristics make R&D a riskier type of investment. Last, I create two dummy
variables which denote the financial crisis and economic crisis periods similar to Kuppaswamy
and Villalonga (2015). The financial crisis covers the period between the 4th quarter of 2007
through the 3rd quarter of 2008, while the economic crisis covers the 4th quarter of 2008 through
the 2nd quarter of 2009.
However, this essay differs because I am looking at how investor types influence
investments and firm value. In my first essay, I look at aggregate institutional investor variables;
in this essay, I utilize Bushee’s (1998) investor classification. I break my institutional investor
variable into types of investors: Dedicated, Transient and Quasi-indexer. I explore how
Dedicated and Transient investors impact investments during crisis periods. To do so, I create a
dummy variables which indicate if a firm is in the top 2 quartiles of its respective group. For
example, Dedicated equals 1 if the number of dedicated institutional investors is in the top two
quartiles, otherwise Dedicated equals zero. Transient equals 1 if the number of transient
institutional investors is in the top two quartiles, otherwise Transient equals zero. I also explore
if my results are sensitive to the definition of high Dedicated and Transient investor presence by
grouping them based on the top two quintiles instead. My results are the same, so I only report
my findings using the quartile grouping.
I do not explore Quasi-Indexers because the nature of these investors does not incite
change in firm behavior: they hold relatively small amount in any one firm thus there is little
incentive to monitor, and they do not to sell at news because they hold these indexes for long
periods of time. In addition, the percentage of shares owned by quasi-indexers in any one firm is
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much smaller than the percentage of shares owned by dedicated and transient investors.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Institutional Investor Firms
MIN
0.23

MAX
281.11

MEAN
3.44

STD
10.15

CapEx

-13.89%

29.01%

1.51%

3.38%

R&D

-18.91%

60.43%

1.81%

5.70%

0.00

310328.00

2390.81

12642.56

0.00%

99.19%

32.90%

32.45%

0.00

0.16

0.02

0.02

0.00%

67.48%

17.14%

15.05%

% shares owned by
Transient institutional
investors

0.00

100.00%

27.38%

28.00%

% shares owned by
Dedicated institutional
investors

0.00

100.00%

61.07%

30.41%

Volatility

0.00

59.80

0.44

2.92

Liquidity

-7.70

0.26

-0.05

0.35

Leverage

0.00

40.07

0.63

1.83

Salesgrowth

-1.00

489.58%

8.06%

50.04%

Q

Total Assets
% shares owned by
institutional investors
Herf Concentration
% institutional shares owned
by top 5 institutional
investors

When breaking institutional investor firms down based on investor type, I find that firms with
high transient investor presence own approximately 48% of the shares owned by institutional
investors compared to the average presence of 27%. In addition, for high transient investor
firms, dedicated investors only own roughly 42% of the institutionally owned shares compared to
the 61% average. For firms with high dedicated investor presence, dedicated investors own
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approximately 87% of firms owned by institutional investors compared to the average of 61%.
Transient presence is small for firms with very high dedicated investor presence; transient
investors own only an average of 10% of the institutionally owned shares for these firms.

Table 2
Means of High Transient Firms Across Periods
Period
Frequency
Q
CapEx
R&D
No/Low-Transient
Pre-Crisis
16782
4.0072
0.0140
0.0160
No/Low-Transient Financial Crisis
2992
4.3918
0.0163
0.0203
No/Low-Transient Economic Crisis
2217
3.5606
0.0131
0.0197
High-Transient
Pre-Crisis
16557
3.0310
0.0161
0.0181
High-Transient
Financial Crisis
3354
2.4423
0.0177
0.0223
High-Transient
Economic Crisis
2124
2.2042
0.0126
0.0248
Means of High Dedicated Firms Across Periods

No/Low-Dedicated
No/Low-Dedicated
No/Low-Dedicated
High-Dedicated
High-Dedicated
High-Dedicated

Period
Frequency
Pre-Crisis
17550
Financial Crisis
3380
Economic Crisis
2100
Pre-Crisis
15789
Financial Crisis
2966
Economic Crisis
2241

Q
3.0382
2.7296
2.4229
4.0616
4.0951
3.3442

CapEx
0.0156
0.0179
0.0128
0.0145
0.0160
0.0129

R&D
0.0180
0.0231
0.0259
0.0159
0.0194
0.0186

Transient Dedicated
0.0602
0.7987
0.0631
0.8098
0.0700
0.7930
0.4853
0.4227
0.4814
0.4197
0.4540
0.4586

Transient Dedicated
0.4399
0.3729
0.4582
0.3624
0.4252
0.3802
0.0901
0.8707
0.0978
0.8651
0.1102
0.8522

3.3 Models
First I explore how institutional investors impact investments during the crisis periods. As I am
interested in how institutional investor types impact investments during crisis periods, I include
interaction terms which capture this effect. I run variations of the following model using the
institutional investor and investment variables discussed above.
Investment = α +𝛽1InvType + 𝛽2Q + 𝛽3Liquidity + 𝛽4 Salesgrowth + 𝛽5Volume + 𝛽6Fincrisis
+ 𝛽7Econcrisis + 𝛽8Fincrisis x InvType + 𝛽9Econcrisis x InvType
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“InvType” could measure either Dedicated or Transient investors as defined in the previous
section.
In addition, I investigate why institutional investors may actively influence investment
behavior during crisis periods by exploring how a change in investments impacts firm
performance, as measured by Q, during crisis periods. I run the following model.
Tobin’s Q = α +𝛽1InstInv + 𝛽2Investments + 𝛽3Leverage + 𝛽4 Log(Total Assets) +
𝛽5Fincrisis + 𝛽6Econcrisis + 𝛽7Fincrisis x Investment + 𝛽8Econcrisis x Investment
Last, I investigate how institutional investors impact firm performance during crisis
periods. I am interested in the effects provided by my interaction terms “crisis period x
institutional investor.”
Tobin’s Q = α +𝛽1 InvType + 𝛽2Investments + 𝛽3Leverage + 𝛽4 Log(Total Assets) +
𝛽5Fincrisis + 𝛽6 Econcrisis + 𝛽7Fincrisis x InvType + 𝛽8Econcrisis x InvType

The control variables used for each model are collected from previous literature.

3.4 Dataset
The dataset for this essay differs from my first essay in one major way: I restrict the sample
to include only firms with institutional investor presence. That is, if a firm has no institutional
investor presence in its ownership structure, I delete that firm from my sample. This creates a
sample bias because Thomson Reuters only contains ownership information by institutional
managers with $100million or more in assets under management as reported on Form 13F with
the SEC. Thus, I may be excluding firms with small institutional investor presence from my
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sample. However, in this essay, I am trying to explore if a specific investor type drives the
results found in my first essay. I feel that the sample bias associated with restricting the sample
is small compared to the benefit of reducing the noise coming from firms without institutional
investor presence.
The rest my data consists of quarterly firm data obtained from Compustat covering the period
between the first quarter of 2003 through the second quarter of 2009. I delete all firms which do
not have at least 1 year (4 quarters) of data or that are in the financial or utility industries because
they are subjected to different operating and reporting restrictions. I also delete duplicate
observations of firms undergoing a shift in fiscal calendar. Last, I winsorize the institutional
ownership variables at the top and bottom 1% level.

4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1

Institutional investor type and investments

I look at two different types of long term investments separately: capital expenditures and R&D
expenditures. Because capital investments have relatively quick payoffs and are less risky,
dedicated investors are likely not encouraged to incite a change in capital investment behavior
during crisis periods. However, R&D is a riskier type of investments because the product of
research and development expenditures is often knowledge or technology. Because of this, there
is much secrecy around its development, and it takes a long period of time to acquire the
knowledge/technology then an even longer time to develop it into a profitable venture for the
firm. In addition, if the firm decides to change direction in the research, or the firm loses a
researcher, there is no ability to recover losses. Because of these characteristics, I expect
investors to be more averse to R&D, especially during periods of increasing financial constraint.
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Because of the differing natures of these investments, institutional investors approach them
differently, and so I investigate them individually in my paper.

4.1.1 Capital Expenditures
If dedicated investors mitigate financial constraints, then the firms in which they invest are better
able to maintain their capital investments in crisis periods. I expect to find that

1.

Firms with greater dedicated institutional investor presence do not decrease their capital
investments from the pre-crisis period to the financial crisis period more than their peers.

However, as institutional investors can use investments as a tool to monitor firm behavior, we
may observe monitoring behavior instead. If this result is observed during the economic crisis
where falling investment quality is dispersed across the economy and we are no longer in a true
liquidity crunch, then this finding strengthens the monitoring theory argument.
When using OLS and Industry Fixed Effects methods, I find that firms with high
transient investor presence decrease their capital expenditures in the economic crisis period more
than other firms which have other types of institutional investor presence. Because this
observation occurs in the economic crisis where business fundamentals are plagued by falling
business fundamentals and asset prices, it does not strengthen the liquidity argument. Instead,
these results show that transient investors do not monitor as tightly as their peers and thus,
transient investors are not the driving factor behind the monitoring behavior found in Chapter 1.
The not significant coefficient on the dedicated investors variable shows that capital expenditures
for dedicated firms do not change during the crisis period; this indicates that firms with greater
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dedicated investor presence are monitored to maintain their capital expenditure behavior even
during crisis periods.

Table 3

Parameter
Intercept
Dedicated
Transient
Fincrisis
Econcrisis
Fincrisis * Dedicated
Econcrisis * Dedicated
Fincrisis * Transient
Econcrisis * Transient
SA-Index
Liquidity
Q
R-Square

OLS Model
Dependent Variable = CapEx
Estimate tValue
Estimate
0.0109 13.6441 *
0.0098
-0.0009 -2.0780 **
0.0017
0.0017
2.4372 **
0.0023
-0.0026 -3.0342 *
-0.0010
0.0001
0.1435
0.0008
0.6801
-0.0011
-0.0025
-0.0017 -6.8963 *
-0.0017
0.0024
3.2596 *
0.0024
0.0001
5.2145 **
0.0001
0.0032
0.0035

tValue
12.7876 *
4.1233 *
3.1122 *
-1.2071

-1.0750
-2.0795
-6.6189
3.2258
5.1202

**
*
*
*

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 Q32008, else Fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else Econcrisis =
0. Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Liquidity = (Net income +
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets.
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Table 4
Industry Fixed Effects Model
Dependent Variable = CapEx
Parameter
Estimate tValue
Estimate
Dedicated
-0.0006 -1.5520
Transient
0.0017
Fincrisis
0.0000
0.0677
0.0008
Econcrisis
-0.0041 -5.3444 *
-0.0023
Fincrisis * Dedicated
0.0004
0.4433
Econcrisis * Dedicated
0.0012
1.1105
Fincrisis * Transient
-0.0013
Econcrisis * Transient
-0.0026
SA-Index
-0.0004 -1.5730
-0.0003
Liquidity
-0.0002 -0.2991
-0.0002
Q
0.0000
1.7830 ***
0.0000
R-Square
0.1865
0.1869

tValue
4.5499 *
1.2717
-3.0178 *

-1.3654
-2.4215 **
-1.1688
-0.3352
1.6649 ***

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 Q32008, else Fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else Econcrisis = 0.
Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Liquidity = (Net income +
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets.

When I use Heckman 2SLS, I find that self-selection bias is present for both the dedicated and
transient models. The characteristics investors use to choose the firms in which they invest
affect capital expenditures (ie: financial constraints and/or growth opportunities), but investors
do not directly select firms based on capital expenditures levels. Because there is a selection
bias present, the best model to use is Heckman 2SLS. When using this model, I find similar
results, but the power is significantly reduced. If you recall, the sample includes only firms with
institutional investors, and so each firm likely has both dedicated and transient investors present
pulling the firm in opposite directions. When adding the correction for selection bias, the
explanatory power of either type of investor is diminished.
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Table 5

Parameter
Intercept
Lag (Dumsp500)
Lag (CapEx)
Lag (Q)
Lag (SA-Index)

Heckman 2SLS Model
1st Stage Dependent
Variable = Lag
1st Stage Dependent
(Dedicated)
Variable = Lag (Transient)
Estimate tValue
Estimate tValue
0.4048
9.5650 *
-0.8178 -18.7785 *
0.4352
7.8072 *
-0.6453 -11.2544 *
-0.2175 -0.7164
0.5382
1.7600 ***
-0.0023 -1.9680 **
0.0037
2.8924 *
0.1760 12.0519 *
-0.2588 -17.2531 *

2nd Stage Dependent Variable = CapEx
Intercept
-0.0038 -0.8000
0.0562
Dedicated
-0.0025 -2.1353 **
Transient
0.0037
Fincrisis
0.0015
0.6320
0.0021
Econcrisis
0.0004
0.1116
0.0008
Fincrisis * Dedicated
0.0016
0.5629
Econcrisis * Dedicated
0.0011
0.3163
Fincrisis * Transient
-0.0013
Econcrisis * Transient
-0.0040
SA-Index
-0.0007 -0.8408
0.0013
Liquidity
-0.0003 -0.2276
-0.0002
Q
0.0000
0.6038
0.0001
Inverse Mills Ratio
0.0220
3.0344 *
-0.0459

6.8722 **
3.0403 *
0.8509
0.3148

-0.4685
-1.4320
1.1060
-0.1150
0.8011
-7.3632 *

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. SaIndex is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Liquidity = (Net income +
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets.

In summary, I find evidence that firms with greater dedicated institutional investor presence
maintain capital investment expenditures during the economic crisis period while less monitored,
high transient investor firms decrease their capital expenditures. This finding is consistent with
monitoring theory.
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4.1.2 Research and Development Expenditures
Next, I explore how institutional investors impact R&D investments during the financial and
economic crisis periods. Because R&D investments are counter-cyclical (Hall, 1991; Caballero
and Hammour, 1991; Lopez-Garcia, 2012), I expect to find that firms with high dedicated
institutional investor presence are less financially constrained and thus are able to increase their
R&D expenditures more than their peers.

2.

Firms with greater dedicated institutional investor presence do not decrease their capital
investments from the pre-crisis period to the financial crisis period more than their peers.

When using the OLS model, I find that institutional investor type has no effect on R&D
expenditures. However, the OLS model does not correct for any endogeneities that are likely
present. When using the industry fixed effects model, I find weak evidence that dedicated
investors monitor firms to not increase their R&D investments. Looking at Table 7, you observe
that the general trend is to increase R&D expenditures during both the financial and economic
crisis periods. However, the negative coefficient on the interaction term suggest that institutional
investors increase their R&D investments less than their peers. Firm which high levels of
transient investors, which are less likely to be monitored, increase their R&D expenditures by a
greater amount than their peers. These findings are consistent with monitoring theory.
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Table 6
OLS Model
Dependent Variable = R&D
Parameter
Estimate tValue
Estimate tValue
Intercept
0.0620 49.3048 *
0.0555 45.9196
Dedicated
-0.0071 -10.8939 *
Transient
0.0078 11.9342
Fincrisis
0.0038
3.5232 *
0.0030
2.6021
Econcrisis
0.0047
3.4669 *
0.0024
1.8673
Fincrisis * Dedicated
-0.0003 -0.2082
Econcrisis * Dedicated
-0.0018 -0.9883
Fincrisis * Transient
0.0010
0.6131
Econcrisis * Transient
0.0021
1.1499
SA-Index
0.0149 37.4871 *
0.0151 38.0676
Liquidity
-0.0476 -41.4794 *
-0.0477 -41.6327
Q
-0.0004 -11.0364 *
-0.0005 -11.3405
R-Square
0.1614
0.1622

*
*
*
***

*
*
*

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0.
Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Liquidity = (Net income +
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets.
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Table 7
Industry Fixed Effects Model
Dependent Variable = R&D
Parameter
Estimate tValue
Estimate
tValue
Dedicated
-0.0049 -7.8951 *
Transient
0.0057
9.2506
Fincrisis
0.0053
5.1445 *
0.0039
3.6137
Econcrisis
0.0059
4.6800 *
0.0026
2.0928
Fincrisis * Dedicated
-0.0013 -0.8615
Econcrisis * Dedicated
-0.0032 -1.8002 ***
Fincrisis * Transient
0.0012
0.7838
Econcrisis * Transient
0.0032
1.8288
SA-Index
0.0106 26.3336 *
0.0109 26.9090
Liquidity
-0.0437 -40.1924 *
-0.0438 -40.2803
Q
-0.0003 -7.0494 *
-0.0003 -7.3193
R-Square
0.2572
0.2578

*
*
**

***
*
*
*

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two quintiles, else
Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient investors is in the top two
quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis
= 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as
intruduced by Hadlock, and Liquidity = (Net income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value
of the firm to book value of assets.

When I employ Heckman 2SLS, I find that dedicated investors do not have a prominent selection
bias, but transient investors do. Transient investors do not pick firms based on R&D levels, but
they do pick firms which have high Q values. Firms with higher Q value tend to invest less in
R&D, and thus transient investors have an indirect selection bias on R&D firms. Dedicated
investors do not pick firms based on current performance, and thus no selection bias is present.
The Heckman 2SLS model, the most appropriate model when selection bias is present, shows
that there is no difference in investment levels for firms with high transient presence. For firms
with dedicated investor presence, it is most appropriate to refer back to the industry fixed effects
results.
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Table 8

Parameter
Intercept
Lag (Dumsp500)
Lag (R&D)
Lag (Q)
Lag (SA-Index)

Heckman 2SLS Model
1st Stage Dependent
1st Stage Dependent
Variable = Lag
Variable = Lag
(Dedicated)
(Transient)
Estimate tValue
Estimate
tValue
-0.5210 -17.3430 *
-1.2813 -37.5231
0.3789
7.6462 *
-0.5012 -9.5802
-0.0002 -0.7700
-0.0001 -1.0080
0.0002
0.2881
0.0043
5.0544
-0.0358 -3.3842 *
-0.3288 -27.7570

*
*
*
*

2nd Stage Dependent Variable = R&D
Intercept
0.0540
3.7705 *
0.0345
3.3655 *
Dedicated
-0.0056 -3.3680 *
Transient
0.0043
2.5473 *
Fincrisis
0.0039
1.1429
0.0015
0.4369
Econcrisis
0.0023
0.5019
0.0007
0.1946
Fincrisis * Dedicated
0.0007
0.1639
Econcrisis * Dedicated
0.0021
0.3990
Fincrisis * Transient
0.0020
0.5109
Econcrisis * Transient
0.0064
1.4521
SA-Index
0.0125 13.2009 *
0.0179 12.0369 *
Liquidity
-0.0463 -20.2374 *
-0.0574 -20.7936 *
Q
-0.0006 -7.6130 *
-0.0006 -5.4987 *
Inverse Mills Ratio
-0.0015 -0.1288
0.0310
4.8783 *
R-Square
0.1642
0.2106
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two quintiles,
else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient investors is in the
top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0.
Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Sa-Index is a proxy for financial
constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Liquidity = (Net income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the
ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets.

4.2 Investment behavior and Q-value
My next question stems from my previous results. Why do dedicated institutional investors
monitor R&D and Capital investment differently? Why do I find that capital investments tend to
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decrease in the economic crisis period but firms with high dedicated investor presence do not
alter their investments to the same extent as firms with high transient investor presence? And
why do I find that R&D expenditures tend to increase during the economic crisis, but firms with
greater institutional investor presence do not increase their investments in the same manner?

The effect of long term investments on firm value has been discussed in literature. It is
generally accepted that long-term investments increase firm value (Chung et al., 1998; Chen,
2006) by allowing firms to innovate and cut costs, subsequently improving their competitive
advantage. I find this to be true as well. The positive coefficient on capital expenditures and
R&D expenditures in the Q model shows that during normal periods, both long term investments
increase firm value. While investments promote long term value, it does so at the expense of
current earnings. Furthermore, how investments affect firm value can change during different
economic periods. For example, Garcia (2013) documents that investor sensitivity to news is
more pronounced during recessions. This increased sensitivity can cause firms with poor
earnings announcements to experience dramatic losses. Thus, heightened investor sentiment can
cause long term investments, which decrease short term earnings, to ultimately decrease firm
value during recessions. As a result, managers may be enticed to decrease investments which
increases earnings and short term value during crisis periods. However, not all investments are
created equally. Capital investments are less risky and increase earnings much quicker than
R&D investments which have very little recourse and can take a long time to turn profitable.
Thus, I expect to find that if firms which maintain their long-term capital investments during the
financial crisis are better able to maintain their firm value, but firms which maintain R&D
investments during the crisis periods find their firm value declines.
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3. Firms which increase (do not decrease) their capital investments during the financial crisis
have lower variation in performance from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period.
4. Firms which decrease (do not increase) their R&D investments during the financial crisis
have lower variation in performance from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period.

The results from all models support these expectations. During normal periods, both
capital expenditures and R&D expenditures improve Q value but during the economic crisis
period, capital investments continue to increase Q while greater R&D expenditures are
detrimental to Q. Since dedicated investors actively monitor firms to ensure they are
consistently making decisions which maximize firm value, we find that dedicated institutional
investors encourage firms to maintain their pre-crisis investment levels: they do not want to
decrease their capital investments which still add value, and they do not want to increase their
R&D investment levels which will cause current value to decrease.
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Table 9
OLS Model
Dependent Variable = Q
Parameter
Estimate tValue
Estimate tValue
Intercept
9.8192 70.6230 *
9.2433 64.1786
CapEx
6.7176
5.5957 *
R&D
10.9501 14.6162
Fincrisis
-0.3567 -3.2131 *
-0.1406 -1.3441
Econcrisis
-0.7607 -5.9182 *
-0.5920 -4.8198
Fincrisis * CapEx
0.9963
0.3643
Econcrisis * CpEx
-1.4259 -0.3988
Fincrisis * R&D
-9.9883 -6.6397
Econcrisis * R&D
-12.6970 -7.5497
SA-Index
3.0232 66.3425 *
2.8462 60.9697
Leverage
3.1700 147.7891 *
3.1602 149.7296
R-Square
0.5522
0.5528

*
*
*

*
*
*
*

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
CapEx = Capital Expenditures / Total Assets. R&D = R&D Expenditures / Total Assets. Fincrisis = 1
if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls
between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as
intruduced by Hadlock, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total assets.
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Table 10
Industry Fixed Effects Model
Dependent Variable = Q
Parameter
Estimate tValue
Estimate tValue
CapEx
3.0917
2.3894 **
R&D
12.3582 15.8767
Fincrisis
-0.3944 -3.5643 *
-0.2079 -1.9926
Econcrisis
-0.8114 -6.3365 *
-0.6474 -5.2927
Fincrisis * CapEx
0.5325
0.1956
Econcrisis * CpEx
-1.5857 -0.4458
Fincrisis * R&D
-10.3387 -6.9087
Econcrisis * R&D
-12.9536 -7.7447
SA-Index
3.1181 63.7396 *
2.9423 59.5581
Leverage
3.1680 145.4579 *
3.1508 146.8996
R-Square
0.5810
0.5588

*
**
*

*
*
*
*

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
CapEx = Capital Expenditures / Total Assets. R&D = R&D Expenditures / Total Assets. Fincrisis = 1 if
the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between
Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by
Hadlock, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total assets.

4.3 Institutional Investor Type and Q-Value
Last, if institutional investors monitor firm decisions during the financial crisis to maximize firm
value, then I expect to see the value of institutional investor presence increase during the crisis
period.

5. Firms with high levels of institutional investors have greater performance relative to lowand no- institutional investor presence during the crisis period.

My ols and fixed effects models show that firms with greater transient investor presence
perform worse than their peers during the economic crisis period while firms with greater
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dedicated investor presence perform better. The results for my Heckman 2SLS tell the same
story. While I do not get a significant change in Q for firms with greater dedicated investor
presence, I do find that firms with greater transient investor presence suffer worse losses during
the economic crisis period. This implies that firms which are not monitored as tightly perform
worse during crisis periods which is consistent with monitoring hypothesis.

Table 11
OLS Model
Dependent Variable = Q
Parameter
Estimate tValue
Estimate
tValue
Intercept
10.0785 69.5973 *
9.6786 69.4576
Dedicated
-0.3546 -4.3966 *
Transient
0.5921
7.3381
Fincrisis
-0.4236 -3.1145 *
-0.2384 -1.6533
Econcrisis
-1.1953 -7.1452 *
-0.5924 -3.6150
Fincrisis * Dedicated
0.2160
1.0831
Econcrisis * Dedicated
0.7467
3.1889 *
Fincrisis * Transient
-0.1908 -0.9584
Econcrisis * Transient
-0.4646 -1.9865
SA-Index
3.0169 66.7493 *
3.0396 67.0684
Leverage
3.1692 150.0869 *
3.1701 150.2041
R-Square
0.5506
0.5510

*
*
***
*

**
*
*

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis =
0. Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Leverage = (long term debt
+ current debt) / total assets.

89

Table 12
Industry Fixed Effects Model
Dependent Variable = Q
Parameter
Estimate tValue
Estimate tValue
Dedicated
-0.3470 -4.2782 *
Transient
0.6179
7.6044 *
0.6179
7.6044
Fincrisis
-0.4849 -3.5758 *
-0.3224
-2.2432
Econcrisis
-1.2626 -7.5748 *
-0.6284
-3.8499
Fincrisis * Dedicated
0.2142
1.0779
Econcrisis * Dedicated
0.7782
3.3352 *
Fincrisis * Transient
-0.1503
-0.7575
Econcrisis * Transient
-0.4918
-2.1105
SA-Index
3.1043 63.8125 *
3.1354
64.2273
Leverage
3.1668 147.6951 *
3.1671 147.7948
R-Square
0.5562
0.5567

*
**
*

**
*
*

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. SaIndex is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Leverage = (long term debt + current
debt) / total assets.
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Table 13

Parameter
Intercept
Lag (Dumsp500)
Lag (Q)
Lag(SA-Index)

Heckman 2SLS Model
1st Stage Dependent
Variable = Lag
(Dedicated)
Estimate tValue
-0.4655 -17.2228 *
0.3831
8.7200 *
-0.0003 -0.5333
-0.0350 -3.6991 *

1st Stage Dependent
Variable = Lag
(Transient)
Estimate tValue
-1.2281 -40.1599 *
-0.5096 -11.0971 *
0.0040
4.9937 *
-0.3261 -30.8356 *

Second Stage Dependent Variable = Q
Intercept
19.6143
9.4706 *
17.2689 19.2008
Dedicated
-0.6280 -2.7410 *
0.3862
2.5448
Fincrisis
-0.1899 -0.3820
-0.6147 -1.9861
Econcrisis
-1.7194 -2.5437 **
-0.1264 -0.3728
Fincrisis * Dedicated
-0.1702 -0.2957
Econcrisis * Dedicated
1.1767
1.5517
Fincrisis * Transient
-0.0170 -0.0476
Econcrisis * Transient
-1.1690 -2.9333
SA-Index
3.8645 29.6593 *
3.4428 27.4981
Leverage
3.1846 70.1521 *
2.8657 71.0390
Inverse Mills Ratio
-6.7115 -3.7570 *
-6.0582 -10.2086

*
**
**

*
*
*
*

* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. SaIndex is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Leverage = (long term debt + current
debt) / total assets.

5.

CONCLUSION

I employ regression analysis to explore how the classification of investors impacts investments
and firm value during the financial crisis. I do not find evidence that institutional investor type
mitigates financial constraints spurring different investment behavior, but I do find that longterm investors provide value-added monitoring benefits during crisis periods through the
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investments channel. While many firms decrease capital and increase R&D expenditures during
the economic crisis, firms with high dedicated investor presence better maintain pre-crisis levels
of investment that decrease value losses during the crisis period. Firms with high transient
investor presence experience greater changes in investment expenditures and thus greater
economic crisis period losses. These findings support monitoring hypothesis and are robust to
regression models which control for industry effects as well as self-selection bias.
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